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THE PROCEDURAL EFFECT OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR'
By WILLIAM L. PROSSER*
HERE is magic in a formula, especially if it be in Latin. Res
ipsa loquitur means nothing more than "the thing speaks for
itself." The phrase is at least as old as Cicero,2 and it has long
been familiar to the law. It seems to have been used first in 1614,
where usury was apparent upon the face of an instrument.3 It
has been employed in connection with the revocation of a license
to use a way,' and misrepresentations in a sale of goods.' In
1863 Baron Pollock casually let it fall in the course of argument
with counsel in a negligence case.6 From this small beginning,
there has developed an extensive "doctrine" of res ipsa loquitur,
which is the source of endless confusion in the courts.
There is more general agreement upon the conditions required x
for the application of the doctrine than as to its effect when ap-
plied. The principle was first stated by Chief Justice Erle, in
Scott v. London Dock Co.:;
"There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where.
the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant
or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of ex-
planation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of
care."
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'See generally Heckel and Harper, Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur, (1928) 22 Ill. L. Rev. 724; Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur, (1934) 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519; note, (1935) 3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 126.
2Oration in Defense of Milo, pars. 53 and 66.
3Roberts v. Trenayne, (1614) Cro. Jac. 508. See also Bank of United
States v. Waggener, (1835) 9 Pet. (U.S.) 399, 9 L. Ed. 163.
4 Nichols v. Peck, (1898) 70 Conn. 441, 39 Ati. 803, 40 L. R. A. 81. 66
Am. St. Rep. 122.
5Patterson v. Landsberg & Son, (1905) 7 Fraser (Sess. Cas.) 675.
6Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 2 H. & C. 722.
7(1865) 3 H. & C. 596.
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Dean Wigmore has suggested' three requirements for the applica-
tion of res ipsa loquitur, which have been more or less uniformly
accepted. The plaintiff must have been injured by an apparatus
or instrumentality whose nature is such that injury is not or-
dinarily to be expected in the absence of negligence.9 At the
time of the injury, both inspection and user must have been in the
exclusive control of the defendant. 10 And the injurious occur-
rence or condition must not have been due to any voluntary action
on the part of the plaintiff."' The purpose of.these limitations is
evident. The circumstances must be such as to give rise to an in-
ference that someone has been negligent, and the defendant's con-
trol of the situation must be such that the inference will point to
the defendant. The mere occurrence of an accident alone, without
these attendant circumstances, never will be sufficient to establish
a res ipsa loquitur case, since it creates no reasonable inference
that the defendant has been negligent. 1
2
Dean Wigmore says further 13 that the force and justification
of the principle lies in the fact that the evidence of the true
cause of the accident is accessible to the defendant, and not ac-
cessible to the plaintiff. In other words, that the defendant is
in a position to explain the accident, while the plaintiff is not.
This certainly is mentioned in many cases14 as a reason for the
85 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2509, p. 498.
9See for example Ash v. Childs Dining Hall Co., (1918) 231 Mass.
86, 120 N. E. 396, 4 A. L. R. 1556; Pichl v. Albany Ry., (1900) 30 App.
Div. 166, 51 N. Y. S. 755, aff'd (1900) 162 N. Y. 617, 57 N. E. 1122. See
Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, (1934) 1 U. Chi. L. Rev.519.
.
0 Sullivan v. Minneapolis St. Ry., (1924) 161 Minn. 45, 200 N. W. 922;
Narbonne v. Storer, (1913) 121 Minn. 505, 141 N. W. 535; Mathews v.
Chicago & N. W. Ry., (1925) 162 Minn. 313, 202 N. W. 896; Klan v.
Security Motors, (Md. 1933) 164 At. 235; Sylvia v. Newport Gas Light
Co., (1924) 45 R. I. 515, 124 Atl. 289; Scellars v. Universal Service, (1924)
68 Cal. App. 252, 228 Pac. 879.
But a too literal application of this limitation leads to such results
as in Kilgore v. Shepard & Co., (R. I. 1932) 158 Ati. 720, where, in defend-
ant's store, plaintiff sat down in a chair which collapsed. It was held that
res ipsa loquitur did not apply, and that a verdict was properly directed for
defendant, because plaintiff was in "control" of the chair at the time of
injury. Of course this is wrong. All that is necessary is that all factors
operating to cause the injury (here only the condition of the chair) be under
defendant's control. Cf. Goldman & Freiman Bottling Co. v. Sindell, (1922)
140 Md. 488, 117 Atl. 866. The Rhode Island court has lost sight of the
inference, in attempting to reduce res ipsa loquitur to a rule of law.
"Cf. Vergeldt v. Hartzell, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1924) 1 F. (2d) 633.
12Benedick v. Potts, (1898) 88 Md. 52, 40 Atd. 1067, 41 L. R. A. 478:
Kemp v. McNeill Cooperage Co., (1918) 7 Boyce (Del.) 146, 104 Atl. 639.
135 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2509, p. 498.
14See cases cited in 45 C. J. 1205, sec. 773, footnote 45.
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application of the rule, and there are even decisions1" to the effect
that res ipsa loquitur is not available to a plaintiff who is in a
better position to produce evidence than the defendant. But this
factor seems not to be indispensable, and may have been over-
emphasized, in the light of cases' 6 applying the principle where the
defendant is dead, or unable to produce any evidence at all. A
few early decisions17 refused to find a res ipsa case in the absence
of a contractual relation between the parties; but this require-
ment is now rejected generally."'
When the plaintiff succeeds in making out a res ipsa loquitur
case, he obtains a procedural advantage over the defendant. As
to the extent of this advantage, and the effect to be given to it, the
courts are not at all in harmony. Since much of the confusion
results from the various meanings assigned to terms such as
"presumption," "inference," "prima facie case," "burden of proof,"
"burden of going forward with the evidence," and the like, it is
necessary to begin any discussion of the problem with definitions.
The following terms will be used hereafter in the senses indicated.
1. Permissible Inference. The least effect which may be
given to res ipsa loquitur is to permit the jury to infer from the
plaintiff's case, without other evidence, that the defendant has
been negligent. Such an inference is enough to satisfy, in the
first instance, the burden which rests upon the plaintiff to introduce
1SBahr v. Lombard, (1890) 53 N. J. L. 233, 21 At. 190. 23 At. 167;
Cass v. Sanger, (1909) 77 N. J. L. 412, 71 At!. 1126; Levendusky v. Empire
Rubber Mfg. Co., (1913) 84 N. J. L. 698, 87 At. 338; Lynch v. Ninemire.
Packing Co., (1911) 63 Wash. 423, 115 Pac. 838, L. R. A. 1917E 178;
Pronnecke v. Westliche Post Pub. Co., (1927) 220 Mo. App. 640, 291 S. W.
139.
'
6 See for example Weller v. Worstall, (Ohio App. 1934) 197 N. E.
410; Monkhouse v. Johns, (La. App. 1932) 142 So. 347. Compare the cases
cited in the annotation, (1934) 93 A. I R. 609, as to the application of
res ipsa loquitur where plaintiff has introduced specific evidence of negli-
gence. See also Galbraith v. Busch, (1935) 267 N. Y. 230, 196 N. E. 36.
'
7Kepner v. Harrisburg Traction Co., (1897) 183 Pa. St. 24, 38 Atd.
416; Stearns v. Ontario Spinning Co., (1898) 184 Pa. St. 519, 39 AU. 292,
39 L. R. A. 842, 63 Am. St. Rep. 807; Kirby v. Canal Co., (1897) 20 App.
Div. 473, 46 N. Y. S. 777.
'sGriffen v. Manice, (1901) 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925, 52 L. R. A.
922, 82 Am. St. Rep. 630; Bloom v. City of Cullman, (1916) 197 Ala. 490,
73 So. 85; Beall v. City of Seattle, (1902) 28 Wash. 593, 69 Pac. 12, 61
L. R. A. 583, 92 Am. St. Rep. 892. See also cases cited in 45 C. J. 1205.
sec. 776, footnote 65.
The idea still survives in Pennsylvania, in the form of a requirement
that the defendant must have undertaken a responsibility for the plaintiff's
safety. This is admitted to be out of line with other jurisdictions. Fitz-
patrick v. Penfield, (1920) 267 Pa. St. 564, 109 Atl. 653; Johns v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., (1910) 226 Pa. St. 319, 75 At. 408, 28 L. R. A. (N.S.) 591;
Fox v. City of Philadelphia, (1904) 208 Pa. St. 127, 57 Atd. 356.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
evidence upon which reasonable men may find in his favor. It is
enough to avoid a nonsuit, or a dismissal. It is not enough to
entitle him to a directed verdict, even though the defendant rests
without evidence. It shifts no "burden" to the defendant, except
in the sense that if the defendant offers no evidence, he runs the
risk that the jury may find against him. The jury will be per-
mitted to accept the inference, but it is not compulsory; if they
see fit to find for the defendant, they are free to do so. A verdict
either way will be sustained.19 In other words, a "permissible
inference" makes enough of a case to get to the jury, and no more.
Sometimes it is called a "prima facie case," but as that term is
used by some courts to designate a presumption, it will be avoid-
ed in this discussion.
2. Presumptio. A greater advantage is given to the plaintiff
if his res ipsa loquitur case is treated as creating a presumption.
This means that the jury will not merely be permitted to infer
the defendant's negligence, but, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, will be required by the court to do so. In other words,
if the defendant rests without evidence, the plaintiff will be entitled
to a directed verdict. The burden of going forward with evidence
is placed upon the defendant, in the sense that if he does not offer
evidence, a verdict will necessarily be directed against him. If the
defendant does offer substantial evidence, the presumption is "re-
butted ;" it is more correct to say that since there is now evidence
on either side, the jury may find either way, and there is no oc-
casion for a directed verdict-the presumption merely disappears.
The presumption does not transfer to the defendant the "burden
of proof" in the sense of requiring the defendant to produce evi-
dence of greater weight than that offered by the plaintiff. If,
when all the evidence is in, it is evenly balanced, the verdict must
be for the defendant. 20
3. Burden of Proof. The greatest effect given to res ipsa
loquitur is to place upon the defendant the ultimate burden of
proof. This means that the defendant is required to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was not caused
by his negligence. He is required to produce evidence which will
"9Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, (1934) 1 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 519, 523. Cf. Heckel and Harper, Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur, (1928) 22 Il. L. Rev. 724, 729.
205 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2490, p. 449; Heckel and Harper,
Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, (1928) 22 Ill. L. Rev. 724,
730; Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, (1934) 1 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 519, 524.
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have greater weight than that offered by the plaintiff. Upon all
the evidence, the defendant's case must outweigh that of the plain-
tiff; if the two are evenly balanced, the defendant must lose.
Since the weight of evidence ordinarily is for the jury, the ques-
tion usually arises upon instructions to the jury; but if it is clear
that the defendant has failed to sustain the burden, the court must
direct a verdict against him.21
Although it must be assumed that these terms will be given
different meanings by many courts, they have been adopted by
most writers, 22 and it is convenient to make use of them.
Any attempt to classify cases involving the effect of res ipsa
loquitur must necessarily depend upon the interpretation placed
on very ambiguous language in the opinions, much of which was
written casually, and without thought of the above distinctions.
It seems clear, however, that the greater number of courts treat
res ipsa loquitur as giving rise to nothing more than a mere per-
missible inference, which neither creates a presumption, nor shifts
any burden to the defendant. This appears to be the view taken
in Arizona, 23  Connecticut, 24  Georgia,2 5  Iowa,20  Kentucky,"
215 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2485, p. 437; Heckel and Harper,
Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, (1928) 22 Ill. L. Rev. 724, 730;
Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, (1934) 1 U. Chi. L. Rev.
519, 525.
-
2See Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, ch. VIII, IX; 5 Wig-
more, Evidence, 2d ed., secs. 2485-2494, pp. 437-459; Morgan, Some Observa-
tions About Presumptions, (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 906; Morgan, Pre-
sumptions and Burden of Proof, (1933) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59; Bohlen, The
Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof, (1920)
68 U. Pa. L. Rev. 307; Harper, Law of Torts, sec. 77, pp. 184-186.2sPickwick Stages Corp. v. Messinger, (Ariz. 1934) 36 P. (2d) 168.24Stebel v. Connecticut Co., (1915) 90 Conn. 24, 96 At. 171; Shwowski
v. New York, N. H. & H. _R., (1920) 94 Conn. 303, 108 AtI. 805; Hunt
v. Central Vermont Ry., (1923) 99 Conn. 657, 122 Atl. 563; Ruerat v.
Stevens, (1931) 113 Conn. 333, 155 Ati. 219; Jump v. Ensign-Bickford Co..(Conn. 1933) 167 Atl. 90; Motiejaitis v. Johnson, (Conn. 1933) 169 Atd.
606; Gorfain v. Gorfain, (Conn. 1934) 172 At. 924. Apparently in favor
of a presumption are Feeney v. New York Waist House, (1927) 105 Conn.
647, 136 Atl. 554; Schiesel v. S. Z. Poli Realty Co., (1928) 108 Conn. 115,
142 AUt. 812. See also Hutchins, Res Ipsa Loquitur, (1929) 3 Conn. Bar.
J. 35.25Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co., (1903) 117 Ga. 106, 43 S. E. 443; Palmer
Brick Co. v. Chenall, (1904) 119 Ga. 837, 47 S. E. 329; Sinkovitz v. Peters
Land Co., (1909) 5 Ga. App. 788, 64 S. E. 93; Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Danneman, (1920) 25 Ga. App. 43, 102 S. E. 542; Bonita Theatre v.
Bridges, (1924) 31 Ga. App. 807, 122 S. E. 255; Candler v. Automatic
Heating, (1929) 40 Ga. App. 280, 149 S. E. 287.26Earlier cases apparently applied a presumption, or shifted the bur-
den of proof. Fitch v. Mason City & C. L. Traction Co., (1904) 124 Iowa
665, 100 N. W. 618; Nicoll v. Sweet, (1913) 163 Iowa 683, 144 N. W.
615, L. R. A. 1918C 1099, Ann. Cas. 1916C 661; Weber v. Chicago, R. I.
& P. R. R., (1915) 175 Iowa 358, 151 N. W. 852, L R. A. 1918A 626;
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Maine,2 8 Minnesota,2 9 Mississippi,"0 Missouri,"1 Montana,32 New
Brown v. Des Moines Steam Bottling Works, (1916) 174 Iowa 715, 156
N. W. 829, 1 A. L. R. 835. See also Crozier v. Hawkeye Stages, (1929)
209 Iowa 313, 228 N. W. 320. But in Anderson v. Fort Dodge, D. M. & S.
Ry., (1929) 208 Iowa 369, 226 N. W. 151, the court reviewed the situation,
and pronounced definitely in favor of the inference theory. To the same
effect are Duncan v. Fort Dodge Gas & Electric Co., (1922) 193 Iowa 1127,
188 N. W. 865; Whitmore v. Herrick, (1928) 205 Iowa 621, 218 N. W.
334; Harvey v. Borg, (1934) 218 Iowa 1228, 257 N. W. 190; Sutcliffe v.
Fort Dodge Gas & Elec. Co., (1934) 218 Iowa 1386, 257 N. W. 406.
27Probably. Res ipsa loquitur has been treated as a presumption, or as
shifting the burden of proof. T. B. Jones & Co. v. Pelly, (Ky. 1910) 128
S. W. 305; Louisville & N. R. R. v. Comley, (1917) 173 Ky. 469, 191
S. W. 96, L. R. A. 1917C 978; Quillen v. Skaggs, (1930) 233 Ky. 171,
25 S. W. (2d) 33. Other cases look like inference. Paducah Traction Co. v.
Baker, (1908) 130 Ky. 360, 113 S. W. 449, 18 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1185;
Wright v. Elkhorn Consolidation Coal & Coke Co., (1918) 182 Ky. 423, 206
S. W. 634; Watson v. Pullman Co., (1931) 238 Ky. 491, 38 S. W. (2d)
430. Finally, in Black Mountain Corp. v. Partin's Adm'r, (1932) 243
Ky. 791, 49 S. W. (2d) 1014, the court referred to the confusion in the
earlier cases, and seems to have decided definitely in favor of the in-
ference theory.28Leighton v. Dean, (1917) 117 Me. 40, 102 Atl. 565, L. R. A. 1918B
922; Edwards v. Cumberland County Power & Light Co., (1929) 128 Me.
207, 146 Atl. 700; Chaisson v. Williams, (1931) 130 Me. 341, 156 Atd. 154.29Keithley v. Hettinger, (1916) 133 Minn. 36, 157 N. W. 897, Ann.
Cas. 1918D 376; Holt v. Ten Broeck, (1916) 134 Minn. 458, 159 N. W.
1073, Ann. Cas. 1918E 256; Kleinman v. Banner Laundry Co., (1921) 150
Minn. 515, 186 N. W. 123, 23 A. L. R. 479; Sullivan v. Minneapolis St.
Ry., (1924) 161 Minn. 45, 200 N. W. 922; Ryan v. St. Paul Union Depot
Co., (1926) 168 Minn. 287, 210 N. W. 32. Earlier cases, speaking of pre-
sumptions or shifting the burden of proof, are now overruled. Ryder v.
Kinsey, (1895) 62 Minn. 85, 64 N, W. 94, 34 L. R. A. 557, 54 Am. St.
Rep. 623; Gould v. Winona Gas Co., (1907) 100 Minn. 258, 111 N. W.
254, 10 L. R. A. (N.S.) 889; Jones v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., (1912)
118 Minn. 217, 136 N. W. 741, 40 L. R. A. (N.S.) 485.30Alabama & V. Ry. v. Groome, (1910) 97 Miss. 201, 52 So. 703 (res
ipsa loquitur ordinarily sets up merely an inference for the jury; on the
particular facts, the inference is so strong as to amount to a presumption;
a very good case) ; Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., (1918) 117 Miss.
490, 78 So. 365 (no mention of res ipsa loquitur) ; Waddle v. Sutherland,
(1930) 156 Miss. 540, 126 So. 201; J. C. Penney Co. v. Evans, (Miss. 1935)
160 So. 779.
31A long line of cases, headed by Price v. Metropolitan St. Ry., (1909)
220 Mo. 435, 119 S. W. 932, 132 Am. St. Rep. 588, held that res ipsa
loquitur shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. In McCloskey v.
Koplar, (1932) 329 Mo. 557, 46 S. W. (2d) 557, the court executed a
startling about-face and overruled all these cases, holding that it was error
to charge the jury that the burden of proof in a res ipsa loquitur case is
on defendant. Ifis not clear from the McCloskey Case whether the court
regards res ipsa as presumption or inference; but it has been followed by
later cases which clearly say that there is merely a permissible inference.
Walsh v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., (1932) 331 Mo. 118, 52 S. W. (2d)
839; Glasco Elec. Co. v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., (Mo. 1933) 61
S. W. (2d) 955; Harke v. Haase, (Mo. 1934) 75 S. W. (2d) 1001; Herries
v. Bond Stores, (Mo. App. 1935) 84 S. W. (2d) 153; Tabler v. Perry,
(Mo. 1935) 85 S. W. (2d) 471; Williams v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,
(Mo. 1935)'85 S. W. (2d) 624. But compare Hartnett v. May Depart-
ment Stores, (Mo. App. 1935) 85 S. W. (2d) 644, to the effect that in
actions by a passenger against a carrier res ipsa loquitur still amounts to
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Hampshire,33 North Carolina,"4 Ohio,3 5 Oklahoma,'3  South Da-
kota,3 7 Tennessee, 38 Texas,3" Utah,'0 Vermont,1 Wisconsin,' and
the federal courts.' 3
a presumption. See also Gordon v. Muehling Packing Co., (1931) 328
Mo. 123, 40 S. W. (2d) 693.
32Lyon v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1915) 50 Mont. 532, 148 Pac.
386 (semble); Johnson v. Herring, (1931) 89 Mont. 420, 300 Pac. 535
(semble); Mald v. Murray Hospital, (1932) 91 Mont. 251, 7 P. (2d) 228;
Vonault v. O'Rourke, (1934) 97 Mont. 92, 33 P. (2d) 535. The court
talks of "presumptions" in Hardesty v. Largey Lbr. Co., (1906) 34 .Mont.
151, 86 Pac. 29; John v. Northern Pac. Ry., (1910) 42 Mont. 18, 111 Pac.
632, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 85, but it is not clear that it means anything
more than a permissible inference.33
"Res ipsa loquitur" is not mentioned in the New Hampshire cases,
but apparently the court applies the principle as an inference. Boucher v.
Boston & Maine R. R-, (1911) 76 N. H. 91, 79 Atl. 993, 34 L. R. A. (N.S.)
728, Ann. Cas. 1912B 847; Kenney v. Wong Len, (1925) 81 N. H. 427, 128
At. 343; McCourt v. Travers, (N.H. 1934) 175 Atl. 165 (citing English
res ipsa loquitur cases).34Womble v. Merchants Groc. Co., (1904) 135 N. C. 474, 47 S. F.
493; Stewart v. Van Deventer Carpet Co., (1905) 138 N. C. 60, 50 S. E.
562 (semble) ; Lyles v. Brannon Carbonating Co., (1905) 140 N. C. 25, 52
S. E. 233; Ross v. Double Shoals Cotton Mills, (1905) 140 N. C. 115,52 S. F.
121, 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 298; Fitzgerald v. Southern Ry., (1906) 141 N. C.
530, 54 S. E. 391, 6 L. R. A. (N.S.) 337; Morrisett v. Elizabeth City Cot-
ton Mills, (1909) 154 N. C. 131, 69 S. E. 767, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 848;
Ridge v. Norfolk Southern R. R., (1914) 167 N. C. 510, 83 S. E. 762, L
R. A. 1917E 215; Page v. Camp Mfg. Co., (1920) 180 N. C. 330, 104 S. F.
667; White v. Hines, (1921) 182 N. C. 275, 109 S. E. 31; Modlin v.
Chandler Sales Co., (1922) 183 N. C. 63, 110 S. E. 661; Harris v. Mangum,
(1922) 183 N. C. 235, 111 S. E. 177; McDowell v. Norfolk Southern
R. R., (1923) 186 N. C. 570, 120 S. E. 205, 42 A. L. R. 857; Howard v.
Texas Co., (1933) 205 N. C. 20, 169 S. E. 832.
3
5St. Mary's Gas Co. v. Brodbeck, (1926) 114 Ohio St. 423, 151 N. E.
323; Gloacki v. North Western Ohio Ry. & Power Co., (1927) 116 Ohio
St. 451, 157 N. E. 21; Howard v. Pennsylvania R. R., (1930) 42 Ohio App.
96, 182 N. E. 663; Class v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, (1934) 47
Ohio App. 128, 191 N. E. 102. Earlier cases defined the doctrine in terms
of "presumption." Mansfield Public Utility & Service Co. v. Grogg. (1921)
103 Ohio St. 301, 133 N. E. 481; cf. Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Holzenkamp,
(1906) 74 Ohio St 379, 78 N. E. 529, 6 L, R. A. (N.S.) 800, 113 Am. St.
Rep. 980; Loomis v. Toledo Rys. & Light Co., (1923) 107 Ohio St. 161, 140
N. E. 639.36Muskogee Elec Traction Co. v. McIntire, (1913) 37 Okla. 684, 133
Pac. 613, L. R. A. 1916C 351; Sand Springs Park v. Schrader. (1921) 82
Okla. 244, 198 Pac. 983, 22 A. L. R. 593; Carter Oil Co. v. Independent
Torpedo Co., (1924) 107 Okla. 209, 232 Pac. 419. See also Chicago, R. I. &
P. Ry. v. Jones, (1920) 77 Okla. 140, 187 Pac. 233.
37Barger v. Chelpon, (1932) 60 S. D. 66, 243 N. W. 97, clearly says
inference. Patterson v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., (1902) 16 S. D.
33, 91 N. W. 326, looks like presumption, but is not at all definite.8Young v. Bransford, (1883) 12 Lea (Tenn.) 232; Gill v. Brown,
(1914) 130 Tenn. 174, 169.S. W. 752; North Memphis Savings Bank v.
Union Bridge & Const. Co., (1917) 138 Tenn. 161, 196 S. W. 492; Lewis
v. Casenburg, (1928) 151 Tenn. 187, 7 S. WV. (2d) 808; Oliver v. Union
Transfer Co., (1934) 17 Tenn. App. 694, 71 S. W. (2d) 478. The case of
Gorsuch v. Swan, (1902) 109 Tenn. 36, 69 S. W. 1113, 97 Am. St. Rep.
836, seems definitely overruled.39McCray v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry., (1896) 89 Tex. 168, 34 S. W.
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On the other hand, there are a number of jurisdictions which
say that res ipsa loquitur amounts to a presumption, and entitles the
plaintiff to a directed verdict unless defendant introduces evidence
to meet it. This seems to be the position of Illinois," Indiana,
45
95; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Wood, (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) 63 S. W. 164;
Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. v. Roach, (1908) 52 Tex. Civ. App. 95, 114
S. W. 418; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Dunman, (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930) 27
S. W. (2d) 116; Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Elliott, (Tex. Comm'n App.
1935) 81 S. W. (2d) 659 (inference not compulsory, but "burden of going
forward" shifted to defendant! Quaere-see (1935) 14 Tex. L. Rev.
113). The case of Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sheppard,
(Tex. 1916) 189 S. W. 799, which says the burden of proof is on
defendant, appears to be out of line.40Christensen v. Oregon Short Line R. R., (1909) 35 Utah 137, 99 Pac.
676, 20 L. R. A. (N.S.) 255, 18 Ann. Cas. 1159; Furkovich v. Bingham
Coal & Lbr. Co., (1914) 45 Utah 89, 143 Pac. 121, L. R. A. 1915B 426:
Williamson v. Salt Lake & 0. Ry., (1918) 52 Utah 84, 172 Pac. 680,
L. R. A. 1918F 588; Zoccolillo v. Oregon Short 'Line R. R., (1918) 53
Utah 39, 177 Pac. 201; Angerman Co. v. Edge, (1930) 76 Utah 394, 290
Pac. 169. But cf. Dearden v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. R.. (1907)
33 Utah 147, 93 Pac. 271.
4"Houston v. Brush, (1894) 66 Vt. 331, 29 Atl. 380; Desmarchier v.
Frost, (1917) 91 Vt. 138, 99 Atil. 782; Spinney's Adm'x v. 0. V. 1looker &
Son, (1917) 92 Vt. 146, 102 Ati. 53; Stewart v. Barre & Montpelier Trac-
tion & Power Co., (1920) 94 Vt. 398, 111 At. 526; Humphrey v. Twin State
Gas & Elec. Co., (1927) 100 Vt. 414, 139 At. 440.
42Probably. Kirst v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. Ry., (1879) 46 Wis.
489; Kaples v. Orth, (1884) 61 Wis. 531, 21 N. W. 633; Klitzke v. Webb.
(1904) 120 Wis. 254, 97 N. W. 901 ("sufficient when plaintiff rested to take
the case to the jury") ; Lipsky v. C. Reiss Coal Co., (1908) 136 Wis. 307,
117 N. W. 803; Rost v. Roberts, (1923) 180 Wis. 207, 192 N. W. 38. But
see Dehmel v. Smith, (1929) 200 Wis. 292, 227 N. W. 274, which may be
presumption.
43Sweeney v. Erving, (1913) 228 U. S. 233, 33 Sup. Ct. 416, 57 L. Ed.
815; Central R. R. of N. J. v. Peluso, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1923) 286 Fed. 661;
Atlas Powder Co. v. Benson, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1923) 287 Fed. 797; Dierks
Lbr. Co. v. Brown, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1927) 19 F. (2d) 732 (semble);
Cochran v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. R., (D.C. Ohio 1928) 31 F. (2d) 769;
Blanton v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1932) 61
F. (2d) 427. The Sweeney Case would seem to have overruled such pre-
sumption cases as Delaware & H. R. R. v. Dix, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1911) 188
Fed. 901; Chicago Rys. Co. v. Kramer, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1916) 234 Fed.
245. Res ipsa loquitur, as a rule of evidence, logically should be governed
by state law under the Conformity Act, but the federal courts apparently
follow the Supreme Court.
44Hart v. Washington Park Club, (1895) 157 II. 9. 41 N. E. 620, 29
L. R. A. 492, 48 Am. St. Rep. 298; New York, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Bit-
menthal, (1895) 160 Ill. 40, 43 N. E. 809; Chicago Union Traction Co. v.
Crosby, (1903) 109 Ill. App. 644; Everett v. Foley, (1907) 132 I1. App.
438; Heimberger v. Frog & Switch Co., (1911) 165 Ill. App. 317; Mueller
Bros. Art & Mfg. Co. v. Fulton St. Mkt. Co., (1913) 181 Ill. App. 685;
Feldman v. Chicago Rys., (1919) 289 Ill. 25, 124 N. E. 334, 6 A. L. R.
1291 (possibly inference) ; Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, (1930) 341 Ill. 539,
173 N. E. 670.
4"Terre Haute & 1. R. Co. v. Sheeks, (1900) 155 Ind. 74, 56 N. E. 434;
Indianapolis St. Ry. v. Schmidt, (1904) 163 Ind. 360, 71 N. E. 201; Pitts-
burgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Higgs, (1905) 165 Ind. 694, 76 N. E. 299, 4
L. R. A. (N.S.) 1081; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. ladley, (1907) 170
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Maryland,46 New York,4 Rhode Island,"s Virginia,"9 and West
Virginia.50
Ind. 204, 82 N. E. 1025, 84 N. E. 13, 16 L. R. A. (N.S.) 527, 16 Ann.
Cas. 1; Knoefel v. Atkins, (1907) 40 Ind. App. 428, 81 N. E. 600; Pitts-
burgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Arnott, (1920) 189 Ind. 350, 126 N. E. 13,
20 N. C. C. A. 414; Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. R. v. Hill, (1925) 84 Ind.
App. 354, 148 N. E. 489 (possibly inference). But National Biscuit Co. v.
Wilson, (1907) 169 Ind. 442, 80 N. E. 33, 82 N. E. 916, looks like in-
ference. It is settled that the burden of proof is not shifted. Pittsburgh,
C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Higgs, (1905) 165 Ind. 694, 76 N. E. 299. 4 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 1081; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Hadley, (1907) 170 Ind.
204, 82 N. E. 1025, 84 N. E. 13, 16 L. R. A. (N.S.) 527, 16 Ann. Cas. 1.4 Probably. Strasburger v. Vogel, (1906) 103 Md. 85, 63 At. 202;
Walter v. Baltimore Elec. Co., (1909) 109 Md. 513, 71 At. 953, 22 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 1178 (semble); Chesapeake Iron Works v. Hochschild, Kohn &
Co., (1913) 119 Md. 303, 86 Atl. 345 (clearly presumption); Goldman
& Freiman Bottling Co. v. Sindell, (1922) 140 Md. 488, 117 Atl. 866;
Potomac Edison Co. v. Johnson, (1930) 160 Md. 33, 152 At. 633. But
there are cases looking like mere inference. Howser v. Cumberland &
P. R. R., (1894) 80 Md. 146, 30 At. 906, 27 L. R. A. 154, 45 Am. St.
Rep. 332; Benedick v. Potts, (1898) 88 Md. 52, 40 At. 1067, 41 L. R. A.
478; Heim v. Roberts, (1920) 135 Md. 600, 109 Atl. 329; Bernheimer-
Leader Stores v. Burlingame, (1927) 152 Md. 284, 136 Atd. 622. And
Pindell v. Rubenstein, (1921) 139 Md. 567, 115 Atl. 859, talks of inference,
presumption, and shifting the burden of proof. It was held in Potomac Edison
Co. v. Johnson, (1930) 160 Md. 33, 152 Atl. 633, that the burden of proof
is not shifted.
47Most of the New York cases support the presumption view. Edger-
ton v. New York & Harlem R. R., (1868) 39 N. Y. 227; Hogan v.
Manhattan Ry., (1896) 149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403; Loudoun Y. Eighth
Ave. R. R., (1900) 162 N. Y. 380, 56 N. E. 988; Kay v. Metropolitan
St. Ry., (1900) 163 N. Y. 447, 57 N. E. 751; Duerr v. Consolidated Gas
Co., (1903) 86 App. Div. 14, 83 N. Y. S. 714; Cunningham v. Qady.(1908) 191 N. Y. 152, 83 N. E. 689; Moglia v. Nassau Elec. Ry., (1908)
127 App. Div. 243, 111 N. Y. S. 70; Levine v. Brooklyn, Q. C. & S. Ry.,
(1909) 134 App. Div. 606, 119 N. Y. S. 315; Plumb v. Richmond Light
& R. Co., (1922) 233 N. Y. 203, 135 N. E. 504, 25 A. L. R. 685; Gold-
stein v. Pullman Co., (1917) 220 N. Y. 549, 116 N. E. 37, L. R. A. 1918B
1060. Occasional cases make res ipsa loquitur amount merely to an in-
ference. Griffen v. Manice, (1901) 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925, 52 L R. A.
922, 82 Am. St. Rep. 630; Eaton v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. R.,(1909) 195 N. Y. 267, 88 N. E. 378; Schachter v. Interborough Rapid
Transit Co., (1911) 146 App. Div. 139, 130 N. Y. S. 549; Marceau v.
Rutland R. R., (1914) 211 N. Y. 203, 105 N. E. 206, 51 L. R. A. (N.S.)
1221, Ann. Cas. 1915C 511. It is settled that the burden of proof is not
shifted. Kay v. Metropolitan St. Ry., (1900) 163 N. Y. 447, 57 N. E.
751; Cunningham v. Dady, (1908) 191 N. Y. 152, 83 N. E. 689; Gold-
stein v. Pullman.Co., (1917) 220 N. Y. 549, 116 N. E. 37, L. R. A. 1918B
1060; Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. Co., (1922) 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E.
504, 25 A. L. R. 685.
48Ellis v. Waldron, (1896) 19 R. I. 369, 33 Atl. 869; Kearner v.
Charles S. Tanner Co., (1910) 31 R. I. 203, 76 Atl. 833; 29 L. R. A. (N.S.)
537; Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., (1929) 50 R. I. 43, 144 Atd.
884; Di Sandro v. Providence Gas Co., (1918) 40 .LI. 551, 102 Atl. 617
(semble). See also Laforrest v. O'Driscoll, (1905) 26 R. I. 550, 59 Atd.
923; Himes v. Cole Teaming Co., (1916) 39 R. I. 504, 98 Atl. 897.
49Ric-hnond Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Hudgins, (1902) 100 Va. 409, 41 S. E.
736; Norfolk Ry. & Light Co. v. Spratley, (1905) 103 Va. 379, 49 S. E.
502; Norfolk Southern R. R. v. Tomlinson, (1914) 116 Va. 153, 81 S. E.
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There are occasional decisions"' in many courts supporting the
third view, that the ultimate burden of proof is shifted to the de-
fendant, who is required to prove by a preponderance of all the
evidence that the injury was not due to his negligence; but this
position is adopted consistently only by Alabama,12 Arkansas, 3
Louisiana,"4 and Pennsylvania."
89; Hines v. Beard, (1921) 130 Va. 286, 107 S. E. 717; Riggsby v. Tritton,(1925) 143 Va. 903, 129 S. E. 493, 133 S. E. 580, 45 A. L. R. 280. In the
last three cases it is held that the burden of proof is not shifted, contrary
to Washington-Virginia Ry. v. Bouknight, (1912) 113 Va. 696, 75 S. E.
1032, Ann. Cas. 1913E 546.5 Hodge v. Sycamore Coal Co., (1918) 82 W. Va. 106, 95 S. E. 808;
Edmonds v. Monongahela Traction Co., (1916) 78 W. Va. 714, 90 S. E.
230.
51See for example Bush v. Barnett, (1892) 96 Cal. 202, 31 Pac. 2;
Green v. Pacific Lbr. Co., (1900) 130 Cal. 435, 66 Pac. 747; Weber v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., (1916) 175 Iowa 358, 151 N. W. 852; T. B. Jones
& Co. v. Pelly, (Ky. 1910) 128 S. W. 305; Pindell v. Rubenstein, (1921)
139 Md. 567, 115 Ati. 859; Bond v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., (1926)
315 M6. 987, 1002, 288 S. W. 777; Breen v. New York Cent. & I-1. R. R. R.,(1888) 109 N. Y. 297, 16 N. E. 60, 4 Am. St. Rep. 450; Washington-Vir-
ginia Ry. v. Bouknight, (1912) 113 Va. 696, 75 S. E. 1032; Johnson v.
Grays Harbor R. & Light Co., (1927) 142 Wash. 520, 253 Pac. 819. All
of these cases are contradicted by others in the same courts.
52Montgomery & E. Ry. v. Mallette, (1891) 92 Ala. 209 9 So. 363;
Alabama Great Southern Ry. v. Johnson, (1916) 14 Ala. App. 318, 85
So. 257. In other cases the court treats res ipsa loquitur as a presump-
tion, without considering the burden of proof. Mathews v. Alabama Great
Southern R. R., (1917) 200 Ala. 251, 76 So. 17; Central of Georgia R. R.
v. Robertson, (1919) 203 Ala. 358, 83 So. 102; Lawson v. Mobile Elcc.
Co., (1920) 204 Ala. 318, 85 So. 257.
-53Jacks v. Reeves, (1906) 78 Ark. 426, 95 S. W. 781; Southwestern
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Bruce, (1909) 89 Ark. 581, 117 S. W. 564; St. Louis,
I. M. & S. Ry. v. Armbrust, (1915) 121 Ark. 351, 181 S. W. 131, Ann. Cas.
1917D 537. To the contrary is Arkansas Light & Power Co. v. Jackson,(1925) 166 Ark. 633, 267 S. W. 359. And Gurdon & Ft. Smith Ry. v. Cal-
houn, (1908) 86 Ark. 76, 109 S. W. 1017, says "presumption" without
reference to the burden of proof.
54Lykiardopoulo v. New Orleans & C. R. Light & Power Co., (1910) 127
La. 209, 53 So. 575, Ann. Cas. 1912A 976; Dotson v. Louisiana Central
Lbr. Co., (1918) 144 La. 78, 80 So. 205; Vargas v. Blue Seal Bottling
Works, (La. App. 1930) 126 So. 707; Dragg v. Dorsey, (1930) 13 La.
App. 115, 126 So. 724; Motor Sales & Service v. Grasseli Chemical Co.,
(1930) 15 La. App. 623, 131 So. 623; Horrell v. Gulf & Valley Cotton
Oil Co., (1930) 15 La. App. 603, 131 So. 709. Contra, Monkhousc v.
Johns, (La. App. 1932) 142 So. 347.
55Johns v. Pennsylvania R. R., (1910) 226 Pa. St. 319, 75 Atl. 408,
28 L. R. A. (N.S.) 591; Davis v. Kerr, (1913) 239 Pa. St. 151, 86 At.
1007, 46 L. R. A. (N.S.) 611; Shaughnessy v. Director General of Rail-
roads, (1922) 274 Pa. St. 413, 118 Atl. 390, 23 A. L. R. 1211.
Pennsylvania originally based res ipsa loquitur upon a contract rela-
tion between plantiff and defendant. Sullivan v. Philadelphia & Reading
R. R., (1858) 30 Pa. St. 234; Kepner v. Harrisburg Traction Co., (1897)
183 Pa. St. 24, 38 Atl. 416; Stearns v. Ontario Spinning Co., (1898) 184
Pa. St. 519, 39 Atl. 292, 39 L. R. A. 842, 63 Am. St. Rep. 807. Later
it was extended to any situation where the defendant has undertaken to
be responsible for the plaintiff's safety. Fox v. City of Philadelphia,
(1904) 208 Pa. St. 127, 57 Ati. 356. It has not been extended to other
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In addition to the foregoing, there are a dozen or more ju-
risdictions in which the language used by the courts is so uncertain
or conflicting that it is virtually impossible to say what position
they have taken as to the effect of res ipsa loquitur. The list
would seem to include California, 6 Colorado,5" Delaware," Flori-
da,5 9 Kansas,60 Massachusetts,6 Nebraska, 2 New Jersey,43 North
cases. Joyce v. Black, (1910) 226 Pa. St. 408, 75 Atd. 602, 27 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 863; Lanning v. Pittsburgh Rys., (1911) 229 Pa. St. 575, 79
Ati. 136, 32 L, R. A. (N.S.) 1043; Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, (1920) 267
Pa. St. 564, 109 AtL 653. See note, (1922) 70 U. Pa. L. Rev. 105. This
restricted interpretation of res ipsa loquitur accounts for placing the bur-
den of proof upon the defendant.
56California courts have said repeatedly that there is merely an inference,
and that it is not proper to charge the jury in terms of presumptions.
Dowd v. Atlas Taxicab & Auto Service Co., (1921) 187 Cal. 523, 202
Pac. 870; Atldnson v. United Railroads of San Francisco, (1925) 71 Cal.
App. 82, 234 Pac. 863; Crooks v. White, (1930) 107 Cal. App. 304, 290
Pac. 497; Even v. Pickwick Stages System, (1930) 109 Cal. App. 636, 293
Pac. 700; Hilson v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., (1933) 131 Cal. App. 427,
21 P. (2d) 662. Cf. Thomas v. Visalia Elec. Ry., (1915) 169 Cal. 658,
147 Pac. 972. But there are numerous cases which clearly say that there
is a presumption. Judson v. Giant Powder Co., (1895) 107 Cal. 549, 40
Pac. 1020, 29 L. R. A. 718, 48 Am. St. Rep. 146; Osgood v. Los Angeles
Traction Co., (1902) 137 Cal. 280, 70 Pac. 169, 92 Am. St. Rep. 171;
Housel v. Pacific Elec. Ry., (1914) 167 Cal. 245, 139 Pac. 73, 51 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 1105, Ann. Cas. 1915C 665; Morris v. Morris, (1927) 84 Cal.
App. 599, 258 Pac. 616; Lejeune v. General Petroleum Corp., (1932) 128
Cal. App. 404, 18 P. (2d) 429; Lynch v. Market St. Ry., (1933) 130 Cal.
App. 302, 19 P. (2d) 1009. Notwithstanding early cases to the contrary,
such as Bush v. Barnett, (1892) 96 Cal. 202, 31 Pac. 2, it seems settled that
the burden of proof is not shifted. Osgood v. Los Angeles Traction Co.,
(1902) 137 Cal. 280, 70 Pac. 169, 92 Am. St. Rep. 171; Kahn v. Triest-
Rosenberg Cap Co., (1903) 139 Cal. 340, 73 Pac. 164; Diller v. Northern
California Power Co., (1912) 162 Cal. 531, 123 Pac. 359, Ann. Cas. 1913D
908; Scarborough v. Urgo, (1923) 191 Cal. 341, 216 Pac. 584; Seitzman v.
Shere Corp., (1931) 116 Cal. App. 674, 3 P. (2d) 58. See, generally, note
(1924) 12 Cal. L. Rev. 138. Professor Carpenter, of California, classifies
California as a presumption state, Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur, (1934) 1 U. Chli. L. Rev. 519, 525.
57Colorado Springs & Interurban Ry. v. Reese, (1917) 69 Colo. 1,
169 Pac. 572, looks like inference. But Velotta v. Yampa Valley Coal Co.,
(1917) 63 Colo. 489, 167 Pac. 971, L. R. A. 1918B 917 looks like pre-
sumption; and Denver City Tramway Co. v. Hills, (1911) 50 Colo. 328,
116 Pac. 725, casually says "presumption."
58Wood v. Wilmington City Ry., (1905) 5 Pen. (Del.) 269, 64 Atl.
246 (presumption); Edmanson v. Wilmington & Philadelphia Traction
Co., (1922) 2 W. W. Har. (Del.) 177, 120 Aft. 923 (presumption);
Thompson v. Cooles, (Del. 1935) 180 Atl. 522 (inference).
59The only case found is Louisville & N. R. R. v. Rhoda, (1917) 73
Fla. 12, 74 So. 19, which talks of both "presumption" and "inference."
60Mayes v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., (1926) 121 Kan. 648, 249
Pac. 599; Ratliffe v. Wesley Hospital, (1932) 135 Kan. 306, 10 P. (2d)
859; Clarke v. Cardinal Stage Lines, (1934) 139 Kan. 280, 31 P. (2d) 1,
all look like inference. But Potter v. Rorebaugh-Wiley Dry Goods Co.,(1911) 83 Kan. 712, 112 Pac. 613, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 45, clearly says the
burden of proof is on defendant; and Southern Kan. Ry. v. Walsh, (1891)
45 Kan. 653, 26 Pac. 45, and St. Louis S. F. R. R. v. Burrows, (1900) 62
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Dakota,6  Oregon, 5 Washington, 6 Wyoming,"' and the English
courts. 6 8
Kan. 89, 61 Pac. 439, talk of "presumptions," without specifically mention-
ing res ipsa loquitur.
61Most of the Massachusetts cases say inference. Carmody v. Boston
Gas Light Co., (1895) 162 Mass. 539, 39 N. E. 184; Graham v. Badger,
(1895) 164 Mass. 42, 41 N. E. 61 ("presumption of fact"); Melvin v,
Pennsylvania Steel Co., (1902) 180 Mass. 196, 62 N. E. 379; Hull v.
Berkshire St. Ry., (1914) 217 Mass. 361, 104 N. E. 747, 5 A. L. R. 1330;
St. Louis v. Bay State St. Ry., (1913) 216 Mass. 255, 103 N. E. 639, 49
L. R. A. (N.S.) 447, Ann. Cas. 1915B 706; O'Neil v. Toomey, (1914) 218
Mass. 242, 105 N. E. 974; Washburn v. Owens, (1925) 252 Mass. 47, 147
N. E. 564. The uncertainty arises from the fact that these cases are not
clear holdings, and that a strong presumption case, Uggla v. West End St.
Ry., (1894) 160 Mass. 351, 35 N. E. 1126, 39 Am. St. Rep. 481, which
required a directed verdict for the plaintiff, is not expressly contradicted,
and continues to be cited with approval.
6ZSpellman v. Lincoln Rapid Transit Co., (1893) 36 Neb. 890, 55 N. W.
270; Omaha St. Ry. v. Boesen, (1905) 74 Neb. 764, 105 N. W. 303, 4 L. R.
A. (N.S.) 122; Lincoln Traction Co. v. Shepherd, (1906) 74 Neb. 369, 107
N. W. 764, all look like presumption. The first two do not mention res
ipsa loquitur by name. Rocha v. Payne, (1922) 108 Neb. 246, 187 N. W.
804, looks like inference. The burden of proof is not shifted. Omaha St.
Ry. v. Boesen, (1905) 74 Neb. 764, 105 N. W. 303, 4 L. R. A. (N.S.) 122;
Lincoln Traction Co. v. Shepherd, (1906) 74 Neb. 369, 107 N. W. 764;
Mercer v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry., (1922) 108 Neb. 532, 188 N. W. 296.
GsThe cases seem to be in hopeless confusion. Sheridan v. Foley, (1895)
58 N. J. L. 230, 33 Atd. 484 (presumption) ; Trenton Passenger Ry. v.
Cooper, (1897) 60 N. J. L. 219, 37 Ati. 730, 38 L. R. A. 637, 64 Am. St.
Rep. 592 (inference) ; Najarian v. Jersey City, H. & P. R.R., (1909) 77
N. J. L. 704, 73 AtI. 527, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 751 (presumption ?) ; Hughes
v. Atlantic City & S. R.R., (1914) 85 N. J. L. 212, 89 Ati. 769, L. R. A.
1916A 927 (inference, but the burden of going forward with evidence
shifted to defendant!) ; Higgins v. Goerke-Krich Co., (1918) 91 N. J. L.
464, 103 Ati. 37, aff'd (1919) 92 N. J. L. 424, 106 Att. 394 (presumption) ;
Polony v. James Brady's Sons' Co., (N.J.L. 1924) 126 Atl. 675 (presump-
tion) ; Crawford v. American Stores Co., (1927) 103 N. J. L. 320, 136 Atd.
715 (inference) ; Rapp v. Butler-Newark Bus Line, (1927) 103 N. J. L.
512, 138 Atl. 377 (presumption) ; Noonan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., (1927) 104 N. J. L. 136, 139 Atl. 9 (clearly inference) ; Gilroy v.
Standard Oil Co., (1930) 107 N. J. L. 170, 151 Atl. 598 (presumption) ;
Bud Dress Shop v. Newark Glass Co., (N.J.L. 1932) 160 Atl. 212 (clearly
inference) ; Gordon v. Weinreb, (N.J.L. 1935) 181 Att. 435 (inference; "it is
well settled"-sic !). It seems to be settled that the burden of proof is not
shifted. Shay v. Camden & S. Ry., (1901) 66 N. J. L. 334, 49 Atl. 547;
Niebel v. Winslow, (1915) 88 N. J. L. 191, 95 AtI. 995; Nemecz v. Morrison
& Sherman, (1932) 109 N. J. L. 577, 162 Ati. 622. Expressions to the con-
trary in such cases as Polony v. James Brady's Sons' Co., (N.J. 1924) 126
Atl. 675, probably are to be interpreted as shifting merely the burden of going
forward with evidence.
64Wyldes v. Patterson, (1915) 31 N. D. 282, 153 N. W. 630 (presump-
tion) ; Leiferman v. White, (1918) 40 N. D. 150, 168 N. W. 569 (inference).
6 5The note, (1934) 13 Or. L. Rev. 340, concludes that the decisions are
about evenly divided in their language, as between presumption and inference,
and that no case has squarely presented the issue. Koontz v. Oregon Ry. &
Nay. Co., (1890) 20 Or. 3, 23 Pac. 820 (presumption; no mention of res
ipsa) ; Esberg-Gunst Cigar Co. v. City of Portland, (1899) 34 Or. 282, 55
Pac. 961, 43 L. R. A. 435, 75 Am. St. Rep. 651 (inference) ; Boyd v. Port-
land General Elec. Co., (1901) 40 Or. 126, 66 Pac. 810, aff'd (1902) 41 Or.
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Finally, both Michigan 9 and South Carolina 0 reject the en-
336, 68 Pac. 810 (presumption); Chaperon v. Portland General Elec. Co.,(1902) 41 Or. 39, 67 Pac. 928 (apparently inference; burden of proof not
shifted); Duntley v. Inman, Poulsen & Co., (1902) 42 Or. 334, 70 Pac.
529, 59 L. R. A. 785 (inference); Goss v. Northern Pac. Ry., (1906) 48
Or. 439, 87 Pac. 149 (inference) ; Chenoweth v. Southern Pac. Co., (1909)
53 Or. 111, 99 Pac. 86 (presumption) ; Kelly v. Lewis Inv. Co., (1913) 66Or. 1, 133 Pac. 826 (inference) ; Caraduc v. Schanen-Blair Co. (1913) 66
Or. 310, 133 Pac. 636 (presumption); Coblentz v. Jaloff, (1925) 115 Or.
656, 239 Pac. 825 (presumption) ; Gillilan v. Portland Crematorium Ass'n,(1926) 120 Or. 286, 249 Pac. 627 (inference) ; Francisco v. Circle Tours
Sightseeing Co., (1928) 125 Or. 80, 265 Pac. 801 (burden of proof not
shifted); Phillipson v. Hunt, (1929) 129 Or. 242, 276 Pac. 255 (dearly
inference; burden of proof not shifted) ; Eldred v. United Amusement Co.,(1931) 137 Or. 452, 2 P. (2d) 1114 (inference).8OThe cases are in confusion. Beall v. City of Seattle, (1902) 28 Wash.
593, 69 Pac. 12, 61 L. R. A. 583, 92 Am. St. Rep. 892 (presumption ?);
Anderson v. McCarthy Dry Goods Co., (1908) 49 Wash. 398, 95 Pat. 325,
16 L. R. A. (N.S.) 931, 126 Am. St. Rep. 870 (inference ?); Graaf v.
Vulcan Iron Works, (1910) 59 Wash. 325, 109 Pac. 1016 (inference);
Gibson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1911) 61 Wash. 639, 112 Pac. 919(burden of proof shifted ?) ; Wodnik v. Luna Park Amusement Co., (1912)
69 Wash. 638, 125 Pac. 941, 42 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1070 (inference) ; Briglio
v. Holt & Jeffery, (1915) 85 Wash. 155, 147 Pac. 877 (burden of proof not
shifted; language indicating both presumption and mere permissible in-
ference) ; Poth v. Dexter Horton Estate, (1926) 140 Wash. 272, 248 Pac.
374 (burden of proof shifted ?) ; Johnson v. Grays Harbor R. & Light Co.,(1927) 142 Wash. 520, 253 Pac. 819 (burden of proof shifted ?) ; Highland
v. Wilsonian Inv. Co., (1932) 171 Wash. 34, 17 P. (2d) 631 (inference). It
seems clear that the Washington court never has seriously considered the
question.67The only case found is Acme Cement Plaster Co. v. Westman, (1912)
20 Wyo. 143, 122 Pac. 89, which throws no light on the question.66The original case, Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 2 H. & C. 722, looks like
presumption. So do Chaproniere v. Mason, (1905) 21 T. L. R. 633, and
The Kite, [1933] P. 154. But Scott v. London Dock Co., (1865) 3 H. &
C. 596; Briggs v. Oliver, (1866) 4 H. & C. 403; Gee v. Metropolitan Ry.,(1873) L. R. 8 Q. B. 161; Skinner v. London, Brighton & S. C. Ry., (1850)
5 Ex. 787; Parker v. Miller, (1926) 42 T. L R. 408, and Ellor v. Selfridge
& Co., (1930) 46 T. L. R. 236, all look decidedly like inference. Kearney v.
London, Brighton & S. C. Ry., (1870) L. R. 5 Q. B. 411, afrd (1871)
L R. 6 Q. B. 659, supports.either view.
69Michigan defines res ipsa loquitur as a presumption of negligence from
the mere occurrence of the injury alone, and says it is not in force in that
state. Burghardt v. Detroit United Ry., (1919) 206 Mich. 545, 173 N. W.
360, 5 A. L. R. 1333; Fuller v. Magatti, (1925) 231 Mich. 213, 203 N. W.
868; Loveland v. Nelson, (1926) 235 Mich. 623, 209 N. W. 835; Camp v.
Spring, (1928) 241 Mich- 700, 217 N. W. 917; Sampson v. Veenboer, (1930)
252 Mich. 660, 234 N. W. 170; Kerr v. City of Detroit, (1931) 255 Mich.
446, 238 N. W. 190; Eaton v. Consumers' Power Co., (1932) 256 Mich.
549, 240 N. W. 24; A. J. Brown & Son v. City of Grand Rapids, (1933)
265 Mich. 465, 251 N. W. 561. But the principle is applied consistently in
the form of an inference from circumstantial evidence. Barnowski v. Hilson,(1891) 89 Mich. 523, 50 N. W. 989, 15 L. R. A. 33; Sewell v. Detroit
United Ry., (1909) 158 Mich. 407, 123 N. W. 2; Burghardt v. Detroit
United Ry., (1919) 206 Mich. 545, 173 N. W. 360, 5 A. L R. 1333; Love-
land v. Nelson, (1926) 235 Mich. 623, 209 N. W. 835; Weaver v. Motor
Transit Management Co., (1930) 252 Mich. 64; Eaton v. Consumers
Power Co., (1932) 256 Mich. 549, 240 N. W. 24; Durfey v. Milligan, (1933)
265 Mich. 97, 251 N. W. 356. And see Waidleich v. Andros, (1914) 182
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tire doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in express terms, and say it is
not to be given effect, but proceed nevertheless to apply the princi-
ple under different names when the situation calls for it.
All this confusion reigns where there is no evidence before the'
courts except plaintiff's res ipsa case-that is, the occurrence of
the accident under circumstances where accidents ordinarily do
not occur without negligence, and defendant's control of the situa-
tion. When the plaintiff goes further, and introduces specific
evidence of the defendant's failure to use proper care, the problem
becomes more complex. It is commonly said that if the facts as to
the cause of the accident are disclosed by evidence, nothing is
left to inference, there is no room for any "presumption," and the
doctrine has no application and is not available to the plaintiff.'
It is also said that the attempt to prove negligence by specific evi-
dence does not destroy the inference normally to be drawn from
the occurrence of the accident, or waive plaintiff's right to rely on
it.7 2 These statements are carried over into questions of pleading,
Mich. 374, 148 N. W. 824, where the court even used the words "res ipsa
loquitur." See discussion in 45 C. J. 1194.70 The court says res ipsa loquitur is not in force in South Carolina.
Weston v. Hillyer, (1931) 160 S. C. 541, 159 S. E. 390; Correll v. City of
Spartanburg, (1933) 169 S. C. 403, 169 S. E. 84; Heath v. Town of Darling-
ton, (1934) 175 S. C. 27, 177 S. E. 894; Montgomery v. Conway Lbr. Co.,
(1934) 171 S. C. 483, 172 S. E. 620. And there are cases wl'ere it would
seem to be applicable, where the court refuses to permit even an inference
of negligence. Holmes v. Davis, (1923) 126 S. C. 231, 119 S. E. 249;
Watson v. Charleston Stevedoring Co., (1927) 141 S. C. 355, 139 S. E. 778.
But compare Steele v. Southern Ry., (1899) 55 S. C. 389, 33 S. E. 5Q9, 74
Am. St. Rep. 756 (presumption); Sutton v. Southern Ry., (1909) 82'S. C.
345, 64 S. E. 401 (presumption); Shelton v. Southern Ry., (1910) 86 S. C.
98, 67 S. E. 899 (presumption); Sullivan v. Charleston & W. C. Ry.,
(1910) 85 S. C. 632, 67 S. E. 905 (presumption) ; Thompson v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. R., (1920) 113 S. C. 261, 102 S. E. 112 (presumption);
Bunch v. American Cigar Co., (1923) 126 S. C. 324, 119 S. E. 828 (pre-
sumption); Bailey v. Union-Buffalo Mills Co., (1929) 151 S. C. 83, 148
S. E. 703 (presumption) ; Correll v. City of Spartanburg, (1933) 169 S. C.
403, 169 S. E. 84 (inference).
7'Heffter v. Northern States Power Co., (1927) 173 Minn. 215, 217
N. W. 102; Dentz v. Pennsylvania R. R., (1908) 75 N. J. L. 893, 70 All.
164; Anderson v. Northern Pac. Ry., (1915) 88 Wash. 139, 152 Pac. 1001;
Lyon v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1915) 50 Mont. 532, 148 Pac. 386;
Riggsby v. Tritton, (1925) 143 Va. 903, 129 S. E. 493, 133 S. E. 580, 45
A. L. R. 280; Stangy v. Boston Elev. Ry., (1915) 220 Mass. 414, 107 N. E.
933; Baldwin v. Smitherman, (1916) 171 N. C. 772, 88 S. E. 854; McAnany
v. Shipley, (1915) 189 Mo. App. 396, 176 S. W. 1079; Texas Co. v. Charles
Clarke & Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) 182 S. W. 351; Cook v. Union Elec.
Light & Power Co., (Mo. App. 1921) 232 S. W. 248; Heckfuss v. American
Packing Co., (Mo. App. 1920) 224 S. W. 99; Conduitt v. Trenton Gas &
Elec. Co., (Mo. 1930) 31 S. W. (2d) 21.7 2Kilgore v. Brown, (1928) 90 Cal. App. 555, 266 Pac. 297; Partin's
Adm'r v. Black Mountain Corp., (1933) 248 Ky. 32, 58 S. W. (2d) 234;
Cassaday v. Old Colony St. Ry., (1903) 184 Mass. 156, 68 N. E. 10, 63
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where the plaintiff has alleged specific negligence on the part of de-
fendant in his complaint, and seeks to take advantage of res
ipsa loquitur at the trial. No less than four positions have been
taken as to whether he may do so." It is said that plaintiff, by
pleading the specific allegations, has waived or lost his right to
rely on the doctrine ;74 that he may take advantage of it provided
the inference of negligence to be drawn supports the specific al-
legations;75 that it may be applied provided the specific pleading
is accompanied by a general allegation of negligence ;" and that
it is available without regard to the form of the pleading." Missouri
L. R. A. 285; Sullivan v. Rowe, (1907) 194 Mass. 500, *80 N. F. 459;
McNamara v. Boston & M. Ry., (1909) 202 Mass. 491, 89 N. E. 131; Mc-
Donough v. Boston Elev. R.R., (1911) 208 Mass. 436, 94 N. E. 809; Porter
v. St. Joseph Ry., L. H. & P. Co., (1925) 311 Mo. 66, 277 S. W. 913,
26 N. C. C. A. 284; Glasco Elec. Co. v. Union Elec. L. & P. Co.. (1933)
332 Mo. 1079, 61 S. W. (2d) 955; Kinchlow v. Kansas City, K. V. & W.
Ry., (Mo. 1924) 264 S. W. 416; Cullen v. Pearson, (1934) 191 Minn. 136;
Borg & Powers Furn. Co. v. Clark, (Minn. 1935) 260 N. W. 316; D'Arcy
v. Westchester Elec. Co., (1903) 82 App. Div. 263, 81 N. Y. S. 952. See
the annotation, (1934) 93 A. L. R. 609.
73See annotations, (1908) 24 L. R. A. (N.S.) 788; (1915) L. R. A.
1915F 992; (1932) 79 A. L. R. 48.74Midland Valley Ry. v. Conner, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1914) 217 Fed. 956;
Moore v. Clagett, (1919) 48 App. D. C. 410; Contior v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry., (1922) 18 Cal. 1, 207 Pac. 378, 22 A. L. R. 1462; O'Rourke v. MNar-
shall Field & Co., (1923) 307 Ill. 197, 138 N. E. 625, 27 A. L. R. 1014, 22
N. C. C. A. 766; Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Leonard, (1906) 126 Ill.
App. 189; Byers v. Essex Inv. Co., (1920) 281 Mo. 375, 219 S. W. 570;
Lyon v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1915) 50 Mont. 532, 148 Pac. 386;
Austin v. Dilday, (Nev. 1934) 36 P. (2d) 359; Dowdy v. Southern Traction
Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 184 S. W. 687, rev'd in (Te-x. 1920) 219 S. W.
1092.
75Pickwick Stages Corp. v. Messinger, (Ariz. 1934) 36 P. (2d) 168;
Atldnson v. United Ry., (1925) 71 Cal. App. 82, 234 Pac. 863; Palmer
Brick Co. v. Chenall, (1904) 119 Ga. 837, 47 S. E. 329; Terre Haute & I.
Ry. v. Sheeks, (1900) 155 Ind. 74, 56 N. E. 434; Alabama & V. Ry. v.
Groome, (1910) 97 Miss. 201, 52 So. 703; Gallagher v. Edison Illuminating
Co., (1897) 72 Mo. App. 576; Boyd v. Portland General Elec. Co., (1901)
40 Or. 126, 66 Pac. 576, aff'd (1902) 41 Or. 336, 68 Pac. 810; Johnson v.
Galveston, H. & N. Ry., (1902) 27 Tex. Civ. App. 616, 66 S. W. 906.
76Rosenzweig v. Hines, (D.C. N.Y. 1922) 280 Fed. 247; Roberts v.
Sierra Ry., (1925) 14 Cal. App. 180, 200, 111 Pac. 519, 527; Burdette v.
Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, (1911) 166 I1. App. 186; Rauch v. Des Moines
Elec. Co., (1928) 206 Iowa 309, 218 N. W. 340; McDonough v. Boston
Elev. Ry., (1911) 208 Mass. 436, 94 N. E. 809; Kleinman v. Banner
Laundry Co., (1921) 150 Minn. 515. 186 N. W. 123, 23 A. L. Rt. 479; Schaff
v. Sanfders, (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) 257 S. W. 670, affd (Tex. 1925) 269
S. W. 1034; Washington Virginia Ry. v. Bouknight, (1912) 113 Va. 696,
75 S. E. 1032, Ann. Cas. 1913E 546.
77Biddle v. Riley, (1915) 118 Ark. 206, 176 S. W. 134, L. R. A. 1915F
992; Lippert v. Pacific Sugar Corp., (1917) 33 Cal. App. 198, 164 Pac. 810;
Briganti v. Connecticut Co., (Conn. 1934) 175 Atd. 679; Waidleich v.
Andros, (1914) 182 Mich. 374, 148 N. W. 824; Rapp v. Butler-Newark
Bus Line, (1927) 103 N. J. L 512, 138 At. 377, aff'd (1928) 104 N. J. L.
444, 140 At. 921; McNeill v. Durham & C. Ry., (1902) 130 N. C. 256, 41
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has gone off into a controversy as to the distinction between gen-
eral and specific pleadings, which has filled the courts of that state
with cases, and apparently has done nothing to advance the cause
of justice.",
Still further complications arise when the defendant offers
evidence of his own due care. Quite apart from the question of
the burden of proof, it is said that the "presumption" of res ipsa
loquitur is itself evidence, to be weighed against that of the de-
fendant;79 it is also said that it is not evidence, has no weight
whatever, and disappears from the case when the defendant offers
substantial evidence in his own favor.80  There are many decisions
to the effect that defendant's evidence, even if uncontradicted,
merely carries the issue to the jury ;51 others to the effect that it
entitles him to a directed verdict ;12 while at least two courts have
S. E. 383; Union Gas & E. Co. v. Waldsmith, (1929) 31 Ohio App. 118,
166 N. E. 588; Nashville Interurban Ry. v. Gregory, (1917) 137 Tenn. 422,
193 S. W. 1053; Dearden v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. Ry., (1907) 33 Utah
147, 93 Pac. 271; Kluska v. Yeomans, (1909) 54 Wash. 465, 103 Pac. 819,
132 Am. St. Rep. 1121.
7sSee May Dept. Stores Co. v. Bell, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d)
830, discussing the Missouri cases, and concluding that they cannot be
harmonized.
79Bush v. Barnett, (1892) 96 Cal. 202, 31 Pac. 2; Brown v. Davis,
(1927) 84 Cal. App. 180, 257 Pac. 877; Michener v. Hutton, (1928) 203
Cal. 604, 265 Pac. 238; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Hadley, (1907)
170 Ind. 204, 82 N. E. 1025, 84 N. E. 13, 16 L. R. A. (N.S.) 527, 16 Ann.
Cas. 1; Kay v. Metropolitan St. Ry., (1900) 163 N. Y. 447, 57 N. E. 751;
Duerr v. Consolidated Gas Co., (1903) 86 App. Div. 14, 83 N. Y. S. 714.
6OLawson v. Mobile Elec. Co., (1920) 204 Ala. 318, 85 So. 257; Langley
Bus Co. v. Messer, (1931) 222 Ala. 533, 133 So. 287; Bollenbach v. Bloomen-
thal, (1930) 341 Ill. 539, 173 N. E. 670; Scarpelli v. Washington Water
Power Co., (1911) 63 Wash. 18, 114 Pac. 870; Spaulding v. Chicago &
N. W. Ry., (1873) 33 Wis. 582.
81S. H. Kress & Co. v. Barrett, (1933) 226 Ala. 455, 147 So. 386;
Morris v. Morris, (1927) 84 Cal. App. 599, 258 Pac. 616; Hunt v. Central
Vermont Ry., (1923) 99 Conn. 657, 122 Atd. 563; Chicago City Ry. v.
Barker, (1904) 209 Ill. 321, 70 N. E. 624; Potomac Edison Co. v. Johnson,
(1930) 160 Md. 33, 152 Att. 633; Maki v. Murray Hospital, (1932) 91 Mont.
251, 7 P. (2d) 228; Vonault v. O'Rourke, (1934) 97 Mont. 92, 33 P. (2d)
535; Volkmar v. Manhattan Ry., (1892) 134 N. Y. 418, 31 N. E. 870, 30
Am. St. Rep. 678; Marceau v. Rutland R.R., (1914) 211 N. Y. 203, 105
N. E. 206, 51 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1221, Ann. Cas. 1915C 511; Goldstein v.
Levy, (1911) 74 Misc. Rep. 463, 132 N. Y. S. 373; Turner v. Southern
Power Co., (1910) 154 N. C. 131, 69 S. E. 767, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 848;
Weller v. Worstall, (1935) 129 Ohio St. 596, 196 N. W. 637; Chaperon v.
Portland General Elec. Co., (1902) 41 Or. 39, 67 Pac. 928; Caraduc v.
Schanen-Blair Co., (1913) 66 Or. 310, 133 Pac. 636; Coblentz v. Jaloff,
(1925) 115 Or. 656, 239 Pac. 825; Gillilan v. Portland Crematorium Ass'n,
(1926) 120 Or. 286, 249 Pac. 627; Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co.,
(1929) 50 R. I. 43, 144 Atl. 884; Angerman Co. v. Edge, (1930) 76 Utah
394, 290 Pac. 169; Poth v. Dexter Horton Estate, (1926) 140 Wash. 272,
248 Pac. 374; Lipsky v. C. Reiss Coal Co., (1908) 136 Wis. 307, 117 N. W.
803. 62Lawson v. Mobile Elec. Co., (1920) 204 Ala. 318, 85 So. 257; Central
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expressed the opinion that there is no true case of res ipsa loquitur
in which a verdict ever has been directed for the defendant.83
In short, there seems to be no single question as to the pro-
cedural effect of res ipsa loquitur on which statements may not be
found, in the opinions, on either side.
All this is rather marvelous. It suggests that there is a notion
abroad that words spoken in Latin are somehow transcended, and
acquire greater significance than their English equivalents. It sug-
gests that res ipsa loquitur is used in different types of cases to mean
different things, and that if the doctrine is to be considered as a unit,
there is no such thing. It recalls the late Percy Haughton's observa-
tion on the Yale football system, that it was fearfully and wonder-
fully complicated, and fundamentally foolish.
If it he supposed that Baron Pollock had said merely, in English,
"the things speaks for itself," and that no unwieldy "doctrine" ever
had developed, would it not be possible to answer all these questions,
without difficulty and without confusion, upon the basis of com-
mon sense?
In the first place, it should be clear that what we are dealing
with is nothing more than a matter of circumstantial evidence."
Negligence may be proved by circumstances, 85 and in a res ipsa
case, since there is no direct proof of negligence, the circum-
stances are the evidence."8 When a man is found with his throat
of Georgia R.R. v. Robertson, (1919) 203 Ala. 358, 83 So. 102; Bollenbach
v. Bloomenthal, (1930) 341 Ill. 539, 173 N. E. 670; Ryder v. Kinsey, (1895)
62 Minn. 85, 64 N. W. 94, 34 L. R. A. 557, 54 Am. St. Rep. 623; Jenkins
v. St. Paul City Ry., (1908) 105 Minn. 504, 117 N. WV. 928, 20 L. R. A.(N.S.) 401; Swenson v. Purity Baking Co., (1931) 183 Minn. 289, 236
N. W. 310; Cohen v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., (1911) 70 Misc. Rep.
548, 127 N. Y. S. 561; Goss v. Northern Pac. Ry., (1906) 48 Or. 439, 87
Pac. 149; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Rowland, (1932) 16 Tenn. App. 184,
66 S. W. (2d) 272; Oliver v. Union Transfer Co., (1934) 17 Tenn. App.
694, 71 S. W. (2d) 478; Klitzke v. Webb, (1904) 120 Wis. 254, 97 N. W.
901.
88Glowackl v. North Western Ohio Ry. & Power Co., (1927) 116 Ohio
St. 451, 157 N. E. 21; Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., (1927)
100 Vt. 414, 139 AtI. 440.84"What is a res ipsa loquitur case anyhow? Reduced to simple terms,
does it not merely mean that negligence can be proved by circumstantial
evidence and that certain circumstances, as to the character of an accident,
are sufficient to take the case to the jury?" Harke v. Haase, (Mo. 1934) 75
S. W. (2d) 1001.8 Mulligan v. Atlantic Coast Line, (1916) 104 S. C. 173, 77 S. E. 445;
Mathews v. Alabama Great Southern R.R., (1917) 200 Ala. 251, 76 So. 17;
Weleetka Cotton Oil Co. v. Brookshire, (1917) 65 Okla. 293, 166 Pac. 408;
Loveland v. Nelson, (1926) 235 Mich. 623, 209 N. W. 835.
""Res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant the
inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference; that they
furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where direct evidence of it
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cut, and the defendant was the last person seen with him, the de-
fendant's footprints are found leading away from the scene of the
crime, and the defendant is found in possession of a blood-stained
knife, together with the deceased's watch and wallet, nothing is
said about "res ipsa loquitur," but the state's attorney does not fail
to tell the jury that the facts cry aloud to high heaven the name
of the murderer. When a brick falls upon the plaintiff from a
building, whence bricks do not ordinarily fall unless someone
has been negligent, and defendant is in full cortrol of the build-
ing, the evidence is of no different kind or quality.
"When the facts and circumstances from which the jury is
asked to infer negligence are those immediately attendant tpon
the occurrence, we speak of it as a case of 'res ipsa loquitur;'
when not immediately connected with the occurrence, then it is
an ordinary case of circumstantial evidence."8
The ill-starred attempt to distinguish between the two, " and to
say that one means more than the other, is at the bottom of mnost
of the confusion. In the nature of the proof involved, a res ipsa
case does not differ from the ordinary case in which the circunm-
stances indicate that someone must have been negligent, and point
to the defendant as the one responsible.
Circumstantial evidence leads to an inference from the facts
may be lacking, but it is evidence to be weighed, not necessarily to be ac-
cepted as sufficient .... ." Sweeney v. Erving, (1913) 228 U. S. 233, 33
Sup. Ct. 416, 57 L. Ed. 815.
. .. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of common sense, and
not a rule of law which dispenses with proof of negligence. It is a con-
venient formula for saying that a plaintiff may, in some cases, sustain the
burden of proving that the defendant was more probably negligent than not,
by showing how the accident occurred, without offering any evidence to
show why it occurred. Stebel v. Connecticut Co., (1915) 90 Conn. 24,
96 Atl. 171.
"The phrase is nothing but a picturesque way of describing a balance of
probability on a question of fact on which little evidence either way has
been presented." Thayer, in Selected Essays on Torts 599, 604.
"The principal difference between a res ipsa loquitur case and a specific
negligence case would seem to be that the very basis of liability, the existence
of some negligence, may be shown by a particular kind of circumstantial
evidence, namely, an unusual occurrence of a character which ordinarily
results only from negligence .. . and from which, therefore, negligence is a
reasonable inference; while in a specific negligence case the careless acts or
omissions which constitute negligence must be stated and proven. In other
words, in a res ipsa case the ultimate fact, some kind of negligence is in-
ferred without any evidential facts except the unusual occurrence itself;
while in a specific negligence case there must be evidential facts sufficient
to show some negligent acts or omissions which were the proximate cause
of the occurrence." Harke v. Haase, (Mo. 1934) 75 S. W. (2d) 1001.
8
7Cullen, J., in Griffen v. Manice, (1901) 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925,
52 L. R. A. 922, 82 Am. St. Rep. 630.85See annotations, (1907) 6 L. R. A. (N.S.) 337; (1917) L. R. A.
1917E 4; (1929) 59 A. L. R. 468; (1932) 78 A. L. R. 731.
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in evidence to the ultimate fact. A res ipsa case permits the
jury to infer that defendant has been negligent. Does it neces-
sarily do more--does it make the inference compulsory, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary? In other words, does it create
a presumption? Professor Carpenter argues8" that if res ipsa loquitur
amounts to no more than a permissible inference, there is no point
in the requirement of an instrumentality in the exclusive con-
trol of the defendant, since it may be inferred from the nature
of the accident alone that there has been negligence. The answer
would appear to be obvious: the defendant's control of the situa-
tion is necessary in order that we may infer negligence, not merely
on the part of someone, but on the part of defendant. But a
sounder argument may be advanced. If the thing speaks for it-
self, if the inference is sufficiently strong to induce the court to
say that it may be drawn, why permit a perverse jury to refuse to
draw it? If the obvious conclusion from the circumstances is
that defendant has been negligent, why not direct a verdict for
the plaintiff ?
The answer is, that in the usual res ipsa case the inference
of negligence is not exclusive, nor is it so strong that we may
say as a matter of law that the jury could not reject it. If the
defendant's elevator falls while the plaintiff is riding in it, it
may be inferred that there has been negligent construction, fail-
ure to inspect, negligent operation. But it may also be inferred
that there was a defective cable which could not have been dis-
covered by all reasonable care, or that some unavoidable accident
has happened to the machinery. Whether one inference is more
reasonable than the other is a question which cannot be deter-
mined as a matter of law, and must be left to the jury.0 It
is not enough for a directed verdict that the court itself would
S-Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, (1934) 1 U. Chi. L
Rev. 519, 529.
90". .. but that inference is still one for the jury and not for the court.
They may not believe the witnesses; the circumstances may be such that
the jury will attribute the injury to some cause with which the defendant
has nothing to do; they may find the inference of negligence too weak to
persuade their minds; they may think a reasonably prudent man would have
been unable to take precautions to avoid the injury: and, in any event, they
may render a verdict for the defendant. This is within their province even
when there is no explanation by the defendant." Swayze, J., in Hughes v.
Atlantic City & S. R. R., (1914) 85 N. J. L. 212, 89 Atl. 769, L. R. A.
1916A 927.
Cf. Galbraith v. Busch, (1935) 267 N. Y. 230, 196 N. E. 36, a case
involving an automobile running off the road, where the court refuses to
apply res ipsa loquitur, on the ground that the inference pointed with equal
probability to conditions of which plaintiff assumed the risk.
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infer negligence, unless it can say that reasonable men could not
fail to do so.
In the simplest res ipsa loquitur case, there is only a permis-
sible inference of negligence. It is significant that many of the
jurisdictions which give the doctrine greater effect have been com-
pelled to recognize, under other names, the existence of a type of
res ipsa case where there is no more than an inference.9 The
source of the presumption idea is not difficult to trace. It rests
largely upon the feeling that all the evidence must be in the pos-
session of defendant, and he should be called upon to explain,
under penalty of a decision against him. But it never has been
a sufficient defense in a res ipsa case that the defendant has no
evidence, and knows no more about the cause of the accident
than the plaintiff; and there is no policy of the law in favor of
permitting a party who has the burden of proof in the first in-
stance to obtain a directed verdict merely by a showing that he
knows less about the facts than his adversary.9 2 Another explana-
tion lies in the fact that many of the early cases were actions by
passengers against carriers, and, by analogy to the cases of dam-
age to goods, it was considered that plaintiff had established his
case by proving breach of the contract of safe transportation, and
defendant thereafter had the affirmative of the issue as to his
own due care.9 3  This point of view has merged and become lost
in the general "doctrine" of res ipsa loquitur, and carrier cases
O'Baker v. Baker, (Ala. 1929) 124 So. 740; Mathews v. Alabama Great
Southern R. R., (1917) 200 Ala. 251, 76 So. 17; Shafer v. Lacock, (1895)
168 Pa. St. 497, 32 Atl. 44; Durning v. Hyman, (Pa. 1926) 133 Atl. 569;
Pope v. Reading Co., (1931) 304 Pa. St. 326, 156 At. 106; Maltz v. Carter,
(1933) 311 Pa. St. 550, 166 At. 852; Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream
Co., (1929) 50 R. I. 43, 144 Atl. 884. Cf. Dei v. Stratigos, (1926) 287 Pa.
St. 475, 135 Atl. 111, Lesick v. Proctor, (1930) 300 Pa. St. 347, 150 Atd.
618; Lineaweaver v. John Wanamaker, (1930) 299 Pa. St. 45, 149 AtI.
91; Burghardt v. Detroit United Ry., (1919) 206 Mich. 545, 173 N. W.
360, 5 A. L. R. 1333.
2Galbraith v. Busch, (1935) 267 N. Y. 230, 196 N. E. 36.
93Thompson, Carriers of Passengers 210; Laing v. Colder, (1848) 8
Pa. St. 479, 49 Am. Dec. 533; Sullivan v. Philadelphia & Reading R.R.,
(1858) 30 Pa. St. 234; Curtis v. Rochester & Syracuse R.R., (1859)
18 N. Y. 534; Brignoli v. Chicago & Great Eastern Ry., (1871) 4 Daly(N.Y.) 182; Baltimore & Yorktown Turnpike Road v. Leonhardt, (1886)
66 Md. 70, 5 Ati. 346; Spear v. Philadelphia. W. & B. R. R., (1888) 5 Pa.
County Ct. Rep. 393; Patton v. Pickles, (1898) 50 La. Ann. 857, 24 So.
290; Steele v. Southern Ry., (1899) 55 S. C. 389, 33 S. E. 509, 74 Am. St.
Rep. 756; Falke v. Second Ave. R.R., (1899) 38 App. Div. 49, 55 N. Y. S.
984; Elgin, A. & S. Traction Co. v. Wilson, (1905) 217 11. 47, 75 N. E.
436; see note, (1907) 113 Am. St. Rep. 986, 1003; note, (1922) 70 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 105; 5 Wigmore, Evidence, secs. 2508, 2509, pp. 491-493.
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now are treated like others,94. but it has left its mark in many
states.
Thus far we have been concerned with the simplest case. But
there are other cases where the inference of neglignce from the
circumstances is so strong that the jury could not reasonably be
permitted to disregard it-where, in other words, the inference
amounts to a presumption, and unless defendant offers evidence to
meet it, a verdict must be directed for the plaintiff. The orig-
inal case of Byrne z,. Boadle,9" where a barrel of flour fell upon
the plaintiff from defendant's window, seems to be of this kind.
It is difficult to conceive of any reasonable explanation except
negligence, and Baron Pollock quite properly said there was a
presumption If a small piece of mortar falls on the plaintiff from
defendant's building, it may be that negligence cannot even be
inferred; if a brick falls from the same building, an inference
may be permitted; but suppose the falling object is an elephant?
Could any reasonable jury infer that those in charge had used
due care? If a single bottle of Coca Cola explodes, perhaps negli-
gence may not be inferred, since there may have been undiscover-
able defects in the glass; if twenty-seven bottles explode, there
is an inference of negligent bottling;96 but suppose a thousand
bottles explode? If minute particles of glass are found in a can
of spinach, it may be that there is no inference, since they might
have escaped even careful inspection; if the pieces of glass are
larger, the inference is permissible ;97 but what if the article found
in the can is a set of false teeth? In the absence of explanation,
is any conclusion possible except that the canner has been at
fault ?
"We can imagine no reason why, with ordinary care, human
toes could not be left out of chewing tobacco, and if toes are
found in chewing tobacco, it seems to us that somebody has been
very careless."""
94Dobie, Bailments and Carriers, sec. 188, p. 608; 4 Elliott, Railroads,
sec. 1644, p. 573; 3 Moore, Carriers, 2d ed., p. 1477; 3 Hutchinson, Carriers,
3d ed., secs. 1413, 1414, ip. 1700 ff. But see Gordon v. Muehling Packing
Co., (1931) 328 Mo. 123, 40 S. W. (2d) 693; Hartnett v. May Dept. Stores,(Mo. App. 1935) 85 S. W. (2d) 644, to the effect that carrier cases involve
a presumption, other res ipsa cases a mere inference.
95(1863) 2 H. & C. 722.
96Cf. Loebig's Guardian v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., (Ky. 1935) 81 S. W.
(2d) 910, with Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, (1926) 214 Ky. 118,
282 S. W. 778.
97Cf. O'Brien v. Louis K. Liggett Co., (1926) 255 Mass. 553, 152 N. E.
57, with Richenbacher v. California Packing Corp., (1924) 250 Mass. 198,
145 N. E. 281.
"6Cook, C. J., in Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., (1918) 117
Miss. 490, 78 So. 365.
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-is, after all, something of an understatement ; the situation really
calls for a presumption.
So far as plaintiff's right to a directed verdict is concerned,
the effect of a res ipsa case must vary according to the strength
of the inference of negligence to be drawn from the circumstances
in evidence. It may be a permissible inference, or a presumption.
A few courts have recognized this,99 but most of them continue
to cram all such cases into one basket, label them "res ipsa lo-
quitur," and treat them all as leading to the same procedural re-
sult, whatever that result may be. Confusion is inevitable, and
unnecessary. There is no uniform procedural effect of res ipsa
loquitur; it means no more than circumstantial evidence, which
may be strong or weak, according to the facts of the case. 100
Where the plaintiff has introduced specific evidence of negli-
gence, the problem would seem to be no more difficult. Plaintiff
is of course bound by his evidence; but proof of specific facts
does not necessarily exclude inferences. When the plaintiff shows
that he was a passenger on defendant's train, and that the train
was derailed, there is an inference that defendant has been negli-
gent, and a res ipsa case. When he goes further, and shows that
the derailment was caused by an open switch, he destroys any
inference that it was caused by excessive speed or defective con-
struction of the track, but the inference that defendant has not
used due care in looking after its switches is not destroyed, but
is so strengthened that perhaps it becomes a presumption. To
say that res ipsa loquitur does not apply is to say that the
weaker inference may be drawn, but the stronger may not. If
plaintiff goes still further, and shows that the switch was thrown
by an escaped convict with a grudge against the railroad, the
last inference is destroyed, and plaintiff has proved himself out
of court. 10 1 It is only in this sense that when the facts are known
there is no room for inference, and res ipsa loquitur vanishes
from the case. Particularly where plaintiff introduces only slight
99Keithley v. Hettinger, (1916) 133 Minn. 36, 157 N. W. 897, Ann.
Cas. 1918D 376; Kleinman v. Banner Laundry Co., (1921) 150 Minn. 515,
186 N. W. 123, 23 A. L. R. 479; Alabama & V. Ry. v. Groome, (1910) 97
Miss. 201, 52 So. 703; Zoccolillo v. Oregon Short Line R. R., (1918) 53
Utah 39, 177 Pac. 201; Angerman Co. v. Edge, (1930) 76 Utah 394, 290
Pac. 169. Cf. Hilson v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., (1933) 131 Cal. App. 427,
21 P. (2d) 662.
10 An excellent statement of the nature of res ipsa loquitur is found in
Heim, Res Ipsa Loquitur, (1918) 63 Ohio L. B. 369, 372.101See Gray v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1928) 24 F.(2d) 671; cf. Gibson v. International Trust Co., (1900) 177 Mass. 100, 58
N. E. 278.
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circumstantial evidence suggesting a definite cause of the accident,
it cannot be said that the normal inferences are lost. There is little
real dispute about this in the cases; it is only the language of the
courts which is confusing.102
When the specific negligence is pleaded in the complaint, the
problem is somewhat different. If plaintiff pleads specific al-
legations, such as failure to close the switch, and proves at the
trial a case giving rise to a specific inference supporting the allega-
tion, it seems clear that he ought to have the benefit of the in-
ference, and to that extent res ipsa loquitur should apply.0 " The
question is, if he proves no such case, but only the fact of the
derailment, whether he should be permitted to rely on the general
inference of negligence--excessive speed, defective track, defective
rolling stock, or other unknown cause? This is not a question of
evidence, for the inference is there; it is a question of the policy of
the court as to the effect of specific allegations in the pleading
in limiting the issue.'0"
If plaintiff pleads only the specific negligence, without gen-
eral allegations, the general inference does not support the spe-
cific pleading. A derailment alone is no proof of an open switch.
Even here it is arguable that the essential fact of negligence has
been pleaded, and the rest may be disregarded as surplusage.106
The plaintiff might have pleaded negligence generally ;106 should
his attempt to be more specific be penalized by a damaging tech-
nical rule? But on the other hand, the defendant has received
notice of nothing but the specific claim; he comes into court pre-
pared to litigate only the issue of the open switch. Plaintiff has
committed himself definitely to a theory of the facts as to the
cause of the accident. In these days of liberal amendments, it is
an undue hardship upon defendant to require him to meet infer-
ences based on a theory which is advanced for the first time at the
trial. There is a real policy underlying the rule that specific plead-
ings have the function of limiting proof. Plaintiff should be lim-
ited by his allegations, at least in any jurisdiction where a general
10 2See annotation, (1934) 93 A. L. R. 609.
'osSee cases cited in footnote 75.
1O4Discussed in Niles, Pleading Res Ipsa Loquitur, (1930) 7 N. Y.
U. L. Q. Rev. 415; notes, (1933) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 817; (1925) 13 Cal.
L. Rev. 424.
'osSee Nashville Interurban Ry. v. Gregory, (1917) 137 Tenn. 422, 193
S. W. 1053; Heckel and Harper, Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur,
(1928) 22 IIlI. I Rev. 724, 727.
'
0 sSee 6 Thompson, Negligence, 2d ed., sec. 7447.
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allegation of negligence would have been permitted to stand in
the first instance, and he need not have pleaded specially at all.
If more specific pleading is required to begin with," 7 or if the
defendant succeeds in a motion to make the pleading more def-
inite, 10 8 a refusal to apply res ipsa loquitur would be in effect to
abrogate the doctrine entirely.
Where the plaintiff, in addition to the specific negligence plead-
ed, also alleges negligence in general terms, this reason for ex-
cluding the general inference of res ipsa loquitur does not exist.
Defendant has at least received notice that plaintiff is not relying
exclusively upon the specific allegations, and can scarcely claim
to have been surprised or misled. A good attorney will be put upon
his guard. It is true that there is an accepted principle of plead-
ing that specific allegations control or limit general ones; but the
principle has little reason behind it where the specific allegations
clearly are intended, not in furtherance or explanation of the gen-
eral pleading, but as additional specific claims over and above the
general allegation, and not designed to affect it.1"9 Plaintiff might
plead generally in one count, and specifically in another,110 or he
might even plead in the alternative ;"' it certainly is open to him
10oSee Palmer Brick Co. v. Chenall, (1904) 119 Ga. 837, 47 S. E. 329;
Hudgins v. Coca Cola Co., (1905) 122 Ga. 695, 50 S. E. 974; Fulton Ice
Co. v. Pece, (1923) 29 Ga. App. 567, 116 S. E. 57.
'OrIn Rapp v. Butler-Newark Bus Line, (1927) 103 N. J. L. 512, 138
AtI. 377, aff'd (1928) 104 N. J. L. 444, 140 Atl. 921, plaintiff pleaded
negligence generally, and defendant demanded a bill of particulars. It was
held that plaintiff did not abandon res ipsa loquitur by alleging specific acts
of negligence in the bill of particulars. The court said: "The theory that
a defendant, by the making of such a demand, can deprive a plaintiff of the
protection afforded by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, seems to us to be
absolutely without any basis to rest upon. If it be sound, then counsel has
discovered a method of entirely abrogating this doctrine; for it can readily
be imagined that in all actions of this kind hereafter brought the course of
procedure adopted in the present case would be followed." See also Sutcliffe
v. Fort Dodge Gas & Elec. Co., (1934) 218 Iowa 1386, 257 N. W. 406.
It should be noted that the possibility that res ipsa loquitur will be
relied on furnishes an excellent reason for denying a motion to make the
pleading more definite. See Harvey v. Borg, (1934) 218 Iowa 1228, 257
N. W. 190.
09See Christiansen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1909) 107 Minn. 341,
120 N. W. 300; Baufield v. Warburton, (1930) 181 Minn. 506, 233 N. W.
237; Clark, Code Pleading 208.
"
0
°Schaff v. Sanders, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 257 S. W. 670, aff'd (Tex.
1925) 269 S. W. 1034; Gray v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., (C.C.A. 7th Cir.
1928) 24 F. (2d) 671; Burdette v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, (1911) 166
Ill. App. 186; see Sutcliffe v. Fort Dodge Gas & Elec. Co., (1934) 218 Iowa
1386, 257 N. W. 406.
""MacDonald v. Metropolitan St. Ry., (1909) 219 Mo. 468, 118 S. W.
78, 16 Ann. Cas. 810. See Hankins, Alternative and Hypothetical Pleading,
(1924) 33 Yale L. J. 365.
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to plead specifically all possible forms of negligence which might
be involved in the case, and thereby unduly lengthen and encum-
ber his complaint. If he elects instead to condense a part of his
pleading into a general allegation, he is aiding the court. Fur-
thermore, plaintiff's attorney may be uncertain whether he has
really a res ipsa case; he may feel that he may make his best
showing by proving the specific facts, and yet his witnesses may
fail him at the trial. It is a strange rule which discourages him
from pleading the best case he has because he may lose the bene-
fit of a weaker one.112
Sometimes it is urged that by pleading specific negligence,
plaintiff has admitted that the cause of the accident is within
his knowledge, and so is not entitled to rely on res ipsa loquitur.11
The assumption is that res ipsa is based primarily upon plaintiff's
inability to produce definite evidence-in other words, that an in-
ference should not be drawn in favor of one who has other evidence
of the facts. But there is no such principle of evidence,1 1' and the as-
sumption is not borne out by the cases.'15  In any event, if the
assumption be granted, it does not follow that the specific allega-
tion of negligence is an assertion of definite knowledge, or any-
thing more than a notice that plaintiff expects to introduce some
evidence in support of his claim, which may not be at all con-
clusive or destroy the general inference. Where both general and
specific negligence are pleaded, the Minnesota rule' 16 which per-
mits the plaintiff to rely upon res ipsa loquitur even if he does
not prove the specific facts seems less artificial, and more likely
to lead to a fair result on the merits.
The final question, as to the effect of res ipsa loquitur when the
defendant introduces evidence that the accident was not caused by
his negligence, perhaps has given the most difficulty of all. The
controversy as to whether the "presumption" has weight as evi-
dence, and is to be balanced against the evidence of the defend-
ant,'1 7 arises out of a confusion of terms. It seems clear that a
permissible inference is always evidence, has weight as evidence,
and remains to be considered by the jury as long as it may reason-
"
2See Niles, Pleading Res Ipsa Loquitur, (1930) 7 N. Y. U. L Q.
Rev. 415, 426-430.
113 See Roscoe v. Metropolitan St Ry., (1907) 202 Mo. 576, 101 S. W. 32.
1142 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 1286.
I15See footnote 16.
116Kleinman v. Banner Laundry Co., (1921) 150 Minn. 515, 186 N. W.
123, 23 A. L. R. 479.
"
7 See footnotes 79 and 80.
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ably be drawn from all the facts presented. This is merely to
say that circumstantial evidence is entitled to consideration so long,
as reasonable men might base a conclusion on it. On the other
hand, a presumption, defined as the plaintiff's right to a directed
verdict in the absence of contrary evidence, is deleated when the
defendant puts in evidence which will permit the jury reasonably
to find in his favor. It is said to be rebutted; more properly, the
occasion for it is gone, and it vanishes from the case. A presump-
tion is a rule of law, to be applied by the court, and it cannot, by
definition, be determined by the jury.1 1 8
But every presumption necessarily includes an inference. Pre-
sumptions are based upon inferences drawn from common human
experience, and in most cases have developed historically from
permissible inferences." 9 The presumption is the legal effect to
be given to the inference in the absence of contrary evidence; but
the inference must reasonably be there, or there can be no pre-
sumption, and even the legislature cannot create one. 120  When
the presumption disappears because of evidence which will permit
the jury. to find otherwise, the inference remains behind. The
circumstances which give rise to the inference are still in evi-
dence, and still entitled to consideration.1 21
In cases where res ipsa loquitur amounts merely to a permis-
sible inference, the inference should have weight so long as the
jury may reasonably draw it from all the facts in evidence.1 2 2
Where the inference is so strong as to amount to a real presump-
tion, plaintiff's procedural right to a directed verdict may disappear
in the face of defendant's evidence, but the inference remains.
The stronger case surely cannot have less effect than the weaker.
The circumstances still point to negligence, and the inference is
not lost until the defendant puts in evidence which destroys it
entirely."' 2
1185 Wigmore, Evidence, secs. 2490-2491, pp. 449-452.
IloSee Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 317 if, tracing the
development in various instances from mere suggested inferences into pre-
sumptions and rules of law.
'
20See Western & Atlantic R.R. v. Henderson, (1929) 279 U. S. 639,
49 Sup. Ct. 445, 73 L. Ed. 884; note, (1934) 18 MINNESOTA LAw RzviEwv
806; annotations, (1927) 51 A. L. R. 1139; (1933) 86 A. L. R. 179.
1215 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2491, p. 453.
1l2Motiejaitis v. Johnson, (Conn. 1933) 169 Atl. 606; Humphrey v.
Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., (1927) 100 Vt. 414, 139 Ati. 440; Lipsky v.
C. Reiss Coal Co., (1908) 136 Wis. 307, 117 N. W. 803; cf. Minutilla v.
Providence Ice Cream Co., (1929) 50 R. I. 43, 144 Atl. 884.
l23Morris v. Morris, (1927) 84 Cal. App. 599, 258 Pac. 616. Cf. Minu-
tilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., (1929) 50 R. I. 43, 144 Atl. 884.
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But to say that the inference shifts the burden ot proof, and
requires the defendant to produce evidence which will affirnatively
outweigh the plaintiff's case,12 4 is to give to circumstantial evi-
dence greater effect than direct evidence could have. The de-
fendant is required to do no more than to introduce evidence
which, if believed, will permit the jury to say that it is as probable
that he was not negligent as that he was.'22 The question is
largely academic, since few if any cases are ever evenly balanced;
but the inference is nothing more than an element which the jury
may consider in determining whether plaintiff has sustained his
burden by a preponderance of all the evidence in the case.
When the defendant in turn seeks a directed verdict, he is
not entitled to it so long as the jury may reasonably find for the
plaintiff. This means that he must produce evidence which will
destroy the possibility of an inference ot negligence, or so com-
pletely contradict it that the jury could not reasonably accept it,
Naturally the evidence necessary to do this will vary with the
strength of the inference. It takes more of an explanation to justi-
fy a falling elephant than a falling brick, more to account for a
hundred defective bottles than for one. If the defendant proves
definitely by uncontradicted evidence that the accident was caused
by some outside agency over which he had no control,'2 that it
1"4Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, (1934) 1 U. Chi. L
Rev. 519, 534.
Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law upon the Burden
of Proof, (1920) 68 U. Pa. L. Rev. 307, 315, considers that the view that
res ipsa loquitur shifts the burden of proof to the defendant is "in part due
to a failure to discriminate between proof by satisfactory evidence of the
facts and persuasion as to whether those facts show conduct conforming
to or falling short of that of a reasonable man under like circumstances,-
and in part is due to a growing tendency to a compromise between the
modern theory of tort liability as based exclusively on fault and the more
modern renaissance of the ancient concept that every one must answer for
the harm done even by his most innocent acts, by not only raising the pre-
sumption of negligence upon the mere fact of harm done, but by holding
that such presumption requires the defendant to rebut it by proving that he
has done all that is possible to prevent the harm that his activities have
caused."
125Manuel v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., (1933) 134 Cal. App. 513, 25
P. (2d) 509; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Higgs, (1905) 165 Ind. 694,
76 N. E. 299, 4 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1081; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Hadley, (1907) 170. Ind. 204, 82 N. E. 1025, 84 N. E. 13, 16 L. R. A.(N.S.) 527, 16 Ann. Cas. 1; Potomac Edison Co. v. Johnson, (1930) 160
Md. 33, 152 At. 633; Vonault v. O'Rourke, (1934) 97 Mont. 92, 33 P. (2d)
535; Loudoun v. Eighth Ave. R.R., (1900) 163 N. Y. 380, 56 N. E. 988;
White v. Hines, (1921) 182 N. C. 275, 107 S. E. 31; Chaperon v. Portland
General Elec. Co., (1902) 41 Or. 39, 67 Pac. 928.
126Nawrocki v. Chicago City Ry., (1910) 156 Ill. App. 563; Scarpelli
v. Washington Water Power Co., (1911) 63 Wash. 18, 114 Pac. 870. But
the mere introduction of inconclusive evidence suggesting another cause will
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
was of a kind which commonly occurs without negligence on the
part of anyone, 12 7 or that it could not have been avoided by the
exercise of all reasonable care,12 8 it would seem that the inference
of negligence is no longer permissible, and the verdict should be
directed for defendant. Defendant has overthrown plaintiff's res
ipsa case by showing that it is not a res ipsa case. The essential
elements upon which the inference is based-defendant's exclusive
control, the probability that the accident would not have occurred
without negligence-have been removed.
But if defendant merely offers evidence of his own acts and
precautions amounting to reasonable care, it seems more difficult
to justify a directed verdict in his favor. The fact remains that
the accident has happened, and that such accidents ordinarily do
not occur without negligence. The defendant testifies that he used
due care to insulate his wires-but the current escaped, and current
does not escape through proper insulation. 12 9  He testifies that he
inspected his chandelier-but it fell, and properly inspected chan-
deliers do not fall.13 0  He says that he drove carefully-but the
bus went into the ditch, and carefully driven vehicles do not (1o
so.' 3' There is enough in the way of common human experience
not entitle the defendant to a directed verdict. Glowacki v. North Western
Ohio Ry. & Power Co., (1927) 116 Ohio St. 451, 157 N. E. 21; Poth v.
Dexter Horton Estate, (1926) 140 Wash. 272, 248 Pac. 374. The court
in the Glowacki Case is clearly in error in saying that a verdict never has
been directed for defendant.
"27Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, (1930) 341 Ill. 539, 173 N. E. 670.
"28Oliver v. Union Transfer Co., (1934) 17 Tenn. App. 694, 71 S. W.
(2d) 478; Ryder v. Kinsey, (1895) 62 Minn. 85, 64 N. W. 94, 34 L. R. A.
557, 54 Am. St. Rep. 623; Richards v. Oregon Short Line R. R., (1912) 41
Utah 99, 123 Pac. 933.129"The trouble with the defendant's position here is that its case does
not come within the rule invoked. The evidence tending to negative its
negligence was not so decisive as to justify a directed verdict. There was
evidence, to be sure, tending to show that the defendant had discharged the
duty of care which the law imposed upon it. But the current escaped.
Whether the tie wire broke without the defendant's fault, or whether it
broke through insufficiency in size and strength, through lack of guying,
or through other causes for which the defendant was chargeable, was an
open question, too plainly for the jury to merit discussion." Humphrey v.
Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., (1927) 100 Vt. 414, 139 Att. 440.
130 "Evidence tending to show that inspections were carefully and
regularly made is insufficient to establish that the accident itself was not
caused by defendant's negligence. The circumstances and character of the
occurrence were such as to call for the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. The accident was unusual. The plaintiff could not be expected
to define its exact cause. If the inspections which the defendant claimed
were made had been carefully made, it is not inconceivable that the defect
which caused the shade to fall might have been discovered." Goldstein v.
Levy, (1911) 74 Misc. Rep. 463, 132 N. Y. S. 373. Cf. Hunt v. Central
Vermont Ry., (1923) 99 Conn. 657, 122 Atd. 563.
'
31 Francisco v. Circle Tours Sightseeing Co., (1928) 125 Or. 80, 265
Pac. 801.
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to permit the jury to say that defendant's witnesses are not to be
believed, that the care used was not enough, that upon all the evi-
dence no better explanation of the occurrence is to be found than
defendant's negligence. Even though it be the rule that uncon-
tradicted testimony must be accepted, still the defendant's evi-
dence is contradicted by the normal inference to be drawn from
the circumstances. 13 2  Perhaps it is not entirely impossible that
evidence of due care may be so conclusive as to require a directed
verdict,133 but in all but the most unusual cases it should be
denied.' 34
In Minnesota, the question was presented in interesting fashion
in Swenson v. Piffity Baking Co. 3 ' Plaintiff found a larva of a
Mediterranean flour moth in a loaf of bread baked by defendant.
Defendant's evidence described in detail defendant's plant, the
process of manufacturing bread, the apparatus used, the care
taken to keep the plant clean and to avoid such an occurrence, and
the fact that the plant had been passed by public food inspectors.
It appeared that defendant bought only the best grade of flour,
and sifted it through a number of small mesh screens, through
which the larva could not have passed. "Uncontradicted evi-
dence described the measures taken to keep foreign substances
of any nature from getting into the bread," and apparently every
reasonable precaution was taken. Upon this evidence, the court
affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant, saying that, "How
this larva became embedded in the loaf of bread is a mystery."
With deference to the learned court, and recognition that
opinions may differ, it may be suggested that there is no great
mystery. The larva got into the bread in defendant's bakery; it
1s2Cf. Ford v. Schall, (1925) 114 Or. 688, 236 Pac. 745.
'
33The possibility is recognized in May Dept. Stores Co. v. Bell, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 830; Paducah Traction Co. v. Baker, (1908) 130
Ky. 360, 113 S. W. 449, 18 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1185; Boyd v. Portland General
Elec. Co., (1901) 40 Or. 126, 666 Pac. 516, (1902) 41 Or. 336, 68 Pac. 810.
Or at least so it appears.
x"'Morris -,v. Morris, (1927) 84 Cal. App. 599, 258 Pac. 616; Hunt v.
Central Vermont Ry., (1923) 99 Conn. 657, 122 At. 563; May Dept. Stores
Co. v. Bell, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) 830; Chicago City Ry. v.
Barker, (1904) 209 Ill. 321, 70 N. E. 624; Paducah Traction Co. v. Baker,(1908) 130 Ky. 360, 113 S. W. 449, 18 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1185; Potomac
Edison Co. v. Johnson, (1930) 160 Aid. 33, 152 Atl. 633; Najarian v.
Jersey City, H. & P. St. R.R., (1909) 77 N. J. L. 704, 73 AUt. 527, 23 L. R.
A. (N.S.) 751; Francisco v. Circle Tours Sightseeing Co., (1928) 125 Or.
80, 265 Pac. 801; Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., (1927) 100
Vt. 414, 139 Adt. 440; Lipsky v. C. Reiss Coal Co., (1908) 136 Wis. 307,
117 N. W. 803.
185(1931) 183 Minn. 289, 236 N. W. 310.
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could have come from nowhere else. It got in because the de-
fendant's process of manufacture permitted it to do so. It is a
matter of common human experience that worms do not get into
bread in properly managed bakeshops. The presence of the larva
is itself important evidence that something has gone wrong with
defendant's system. It might lead a reasonable man to conclude
that defendant's witnesses are not entitled to belief, that the pre-
cautions described were in this instance not faithfully carried out,
that the whole truth has not been told.1 3c As the defendant's
evidence approaches absolute proof that the larva could not be
there at all, it becomes more obviously contradicted by the fact that
the larva is there. Should the jury not be permitted to consider
the inference that if defendant's evidence were true there would
have been no worm?
All of these questions seem to be capable of solution without
real difficulty. The trouble lies in the Latin formula. Res ipsa
loquitur may be convenient shorthand for designating a particular
kind of case. But so long as its procedural effect is surrounded
by the prevailing uncertainty, its use can (o little to clarify and
much to confuse the issues of a case. It is used in different senses,
to denote evidence of different strength; it means inference, it
means presumption, it means no one thing-in short it means
nothing. Perhaps its most unfortunate result is to suggest that it
is something separate and apart from ordinary circumstantial evi-
dence, and that if the technical requirements for a res ipsa case
cannot be met, negligence cannot be inferred."' The phrase means
186Compare the English court's method of dealing with the same problem,
in Chaproniere v. Mason, (Ct. App. 1905) 21 T. L. R. 633: "The un-
explained presence of the stone in the bun was prima facie evidence of
negligence on the part of the person who made the bun. This was admitted,
and the defendant produced evidence to rebut this prima facie presumption
of negligence. He called witnesses who gave evidence to the effect that in
the manufacture of his buns he made use of a system which rendered it im-
possible that a stone should be present in the dough. One of the witnesses
said that it was not feasible, in the system adopted by the defendant, for
a stone to pass into the dough of which the buns were made. He must have
meant that it was not feasible if proper care had been used. That did not
rebut the presumption of negligence, but, on the contrary, it showed that
the system was not properly carried out-that there was negligence. A stone
did get into the dough, and that fact was evidence that the system followed
by the defendant was not carried out with proper care and skill. There
was, therefore, certainly evidence of negligence causing the injury."
'
3 7 See for example Lanning v. Pittsburgh Rys., (1911) 229 Pa. St. 575,
79 Ati. 136, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1043; Kilgore v. Shepard Co., (R.I. 1932)
158 At. 720.
Another illustration is found in the controversy over the application of
res ipsa loquitur where a passenger is injured by a collision of two vehicles,
one of which is under the carrier's control while the other is not. See
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
nothing more than "the thing speaks for itself." Why not say so
instead? Along with res gestae and other unhappy catchwords,
the Latin tag should be consigned to the legal dustbin.
"It adds nothing to the law, has no meaning which is not more
clearly expressed for us in English, and brings confusion to our
legal discussions. It does not represent a doctrine, is not a legal
maxim, and is not a rule."'1
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annotations, (1923) 25 A. L. R. 690; (1933) 83 A. L. R. 1163. It is held
by many courts, as in Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. R. Co., (1922) 233
N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504, 25 A. L. R. 685, that res ipsa loquitur applies as
against the carrier, but not against the driver of the other vhicle. This
idea may perhaps be traced to the early view that the carrier has the
affirmative of the issue of due care. See footnote 93 and text. Other courts,
as in Klan v. Security Motors, (Md. 1933) 164 Ati. 235, hold thai res ipsa
loquitur does not apply, since the instrumentalities causing the accident are
not within the exclusive control of either defendant. Cf. Sullivan v. Minne-
apolis St. Ry., (1924) 161 Minn. 45, 200 N. W. 922.
But why should it make any difference whether res ilisa loquitur ap-
plies or nqt? The essential question is whether negligence on the part of
either driver may be inferred. There is some basis in ordinary experience
for the conclusion that collisions between vehicles do not occur in the usual
case unless both drivers are at fault. If the court considers the probability
sufficiently great to permit the jury to draw the inference, it should be
permitted against either defendant, without regard to the fact that one is a
carrier. If not, then the inference should not be permitted against one more
than the other. The use of the Latin phrase has entirely obscured the real
problem.
13S"In this case, as in similar cases, the expression res ipsa loquitur
has been the basis of much of the argument, and I venture to urge upon the
attention of the profession in the state an objection to the continued use of
it. It adds nothing to the law, has no meaning which is not more clearly
expressed for us in English, and brings confusion to our legal discussions.
It does not represent a doctrine, is not a legal maxim, and is not a rule.
"It is merely a common argumentative expression of ancient Latin brought
into the language of the law by men who were accustomed to its use in
Latin writings.. . . It may just as appropriately be used in argument on any
subject, legal or otherwise. Nowhere does it mean more than the colloquial
English expression that the facts speak for themselves, that facts proved
naturally afford ground for an inference of some fact inquired about, and so
amount to some proof of it. The inference may be one of certainty, as when
an excessive interest charge appeared on the face of an instrument, or one
of more or less probability only, as when negligence in the care of a barrel
of flour was found inferable from its fall out of a warehouse." Bond, C. J.,
dissenting, in Potomac Edison Co. v. Johnson, (1930) 160 Md. 33, 152
Atl. 633.
